

# Rebel Institutions and Negotiated Peace

Karen E. Albert\*

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## Abstract

Civil wars are difficult to resolve through negotiated settlements. Rebel institutions are thought to make negotiations more successful. I show, however, using a new dataset I collected with annual data on 25 rebel quasi-state institutions for 235 rebel groups (1945-2012) over the course of their existence, that this positive association does not hold. Rather, rebel service provision has a negative correlation with successful negotiated settlements. The well-established literature on commitment problems would suggest that negotiated settlements are not reached because governments end negotiations amidst fears of rebel growth from civilian support derived from service provision. I offer an alternative explanation, strategic stalling, based on rebel incentives to realize the full long-term benefits of service provision. Using qualitative evidence to differentiate between these two possible mechanisms, I show that rebel commitment problems are unlikely to explain the negative correlation, but observable implications of strategic stalling are observed in the cases surveyed.

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\*PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Rochester. Contact author: kalbert2@ur.rochester.edu

# 1 Introduction

Unlike interstate wars, civil wars typically endure for decades, and only rarely end with a negotiated settlement. Between 1945 and 2009, the average rebel group existed for 15 years, and only 26% of rebel groups signed a negotiated settlement.<sup>1</sup> Many scholars have argued that a key impediment to ending civil war is the government's inability to credibly commit to uphold a settlement after the rebels have disbanded (Fearon, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2008; Walter, 2002, 2009; Driscoll, 2012; Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008). Scholars of civil war termination and recurrence have focused heavily on how to mitigate the government's commitment problem, such as the presence of third party guarantees and security sector reforms (Walter, 2002; Toft, 2010; Uzonyi and Hanania, 2017; Licklider, 1995). Rebel institutions, however, should also mitigate government commitment problems. Rebel governance mobilizes civilians who in turn hold the government accountable after civil war (Huang, 2016), thereby resolving the government's commitment problem. A smaller strand of the literature examines the rebel side of the equation more closely.<sup>2</sup> Rebel institutions also abate difficulties rebels face when committing to governments. These institutions reinforce rebel centralization, giving them greater control over their fighters. In turn, rebel groups can commit to the government that their leaders can prevent factions from using violence to derail the peace process, or "spoil" the peace (Heger and Jung, 2017; Zartman, 1989). This leads to a strong *a priori* expectation that rebel service provision, a common aspect of rebel governance (Fukuyama, 2013), should facilitate successful negotiated settlements.

Although institutions might not directly translate into battlefield superiority, they can create other forms of strength that are just as important to civil war, incentivizing rebels to divert resources from building their fighting capacity to providing services to civilians. Rebel service provision wins civilian support and facilitates state-building (Kalyvas, 2006; Heger and Jung, 2017; Stewart, 2018), and rebel taxation gives rebels a steady base of resources for their fighters (Huang, 2016). Rebel governance can solicit support internationally through diplomatic missions (Coggins, 2015) and organize civilians domestically (Arjona, 2014, 2016). These institutions also give rebels legitimacy, both domestically and internationally, while

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<sup>1</sup>Based on the 235 rebel groups in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset using the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset's *Peace Agreement Date* variable (Kreutz, 2010).

<sup>2</sup>Mattes and Savun (2009, 739) provide an example of a rebel commitment problem: rebels have to commit to not re-arming and attacking government forces during the peace talks.

eroding legitimacy from the government (Ledwidge, 2017; Mampilly, 2015). Rebel governance and service provision translates into rebel capacity and strength, which improves rebels' ability to bargain and increases the likelihood of a negotiated agreement (Walter, 2009; Clayton, 2013).

Existing theories, however, fail to consider an important characteristic of rebel institutions: they are a long-term investment. Unlike guns and bullets, which do not increase in value over time, institutions bring rebels increasing benefits over time (Kilcullen, 2011; Arjona, 2016). This important aspect of rebel governance has not been seriously considered in theory-building about the impact of rebel institutions on peace. However, it does have important implications, and suggests two possible countervailing mechanisms at work. Both mechanisms predict a negative effect on successful negotiation, not positive as has been suggested in the literature. The first explanation is a rebel commitment problem driven by civilian mobilization, rather than from spoilers within a rebel group. Rebel service provision mobilizes civilian support for the group (Heger and Jung, 2017; Kalyvas, 2006), and pools of potential recruits increase a rebel group's ability to sustain conflict (Walter, 2004). Governments do not trust rebels to refrain from regrouping through their increased pools of civilian collaborators. Therefore, they are unwilling to negotiate with the rebels. The second explanation is that, although rebel service provision is a powerful tool to win hearts and minds and gain civilian support over time (Kalyvas, 2006, 128), a rebel group must survive long enough to receive the dividends of their investment in service provision.

To test these theories, I introduce a new dataset on rebel institutions, the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset. With this dataset, I provide new data on rebel governance by offering yearly observations for 235 rebel groups<sup>3</sup> between 1945 and 2012 for 25 different institutions. Rather than collecting within broad categories, the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset allows for more disaggregated analysis of the institutions that comprise various definitions of rebel governance. Previously available data was limited either by the time-frame, number of rebel groups covered, or number of institutions covered.<sup>4</sup> The Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset provides a broad overview of rebel institutional activity, including ten institutions I call

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<sup>3</sup>Armed conflict groups from UCDP's Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010) who were involved in a civil war from Fearon and Laitin's 2009 list of civil wars.

<sup>4</sup>The Terrorism and Insurgent Organization Service Provision data (Heger and Jung, 2017; Wagstaff and Jung, 2017; Heger, Jung and Wong, 2017) includes more actors; however, it does not code for as many institutions and only codes back to 1970.

service institutions: 1) Education, 2) Health care, 3) Infrastructure, 4) Transportation, 5) Law, 6) Policing, 7) Justice, 8) Housing assistance, 9) Welfare/Aid, and 10) Constituency politics. Education, health care, and law and order (law, policing and justice) institutions are the most common services provided with over a quarter of rebel groups providing at least one of these five institutions. Infrastructure and welfare/aid are the next two popular services; however, they are provided by only 18% and 15%, respectively, of rebel groups.

I use the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset to show that, contrary to expectations in the literature, the correlation between rebel service provision and negotiated settlements is negative. Since there are two possible explanations for a negative correlation, I use additional quantitative and qualitative evidence, partly based on archival research, to differentiate between them. I show that rebel commitments are unlikely to explain the negative effect of service provision on negotiated settlements. Even though commitment problems are a common theoretical explanation as to why negotiated settlements are difficult to reach, they fail to explain why rebel service provision has a negative effect on reaching successful negotiated settlements. Furthermore, while it is difficult to prove directly that service provision incentivizes rebel stalling, the evidence more strongly supports the stalling explanation over a service-provision created rebel commitment problem.

This paper has direct implications for policy-makers and practitioners. One of the biggest mistakes negotiators make is misunderstanding the nuances of rebel strength: rebel groups do not just invest in military strength. They invest in institutions which give them longevity. Mediators and policy-makers must take into account rebel institutional capacity when negotiating with rebels. Since rebel institutional capacity, particularly service provision, is a different type of capacity than military strength, mediators need to understand how institutions impact rebel strategy. Misjudging rebel institutional strength will lead to mediation failure for two reasons. First, mediators need to understand that rebels with greater institutional capacity have stronger incentives to stall final agreements. Engaging in negotiations gives rebels the opportunity to expect a reprieve from fighting. This is often considered from the military angle where governments' concerns over rebel military mobilization are at times addressed. But, there is an institutional implication derived from stalling as well. Rebel institutions often persist during periods of low violence, and because there is less need for offensive military action, breaks in fighting mean resources can be used for institutional maintenance. Time strengthens institutions and increases the benefits they provide rebels. This leads to the

second reason why civil war mediation will fail to produce a negotiated settlement when rebel institutional strength is misunderstood: successful peace deals will have to address the future expectations of strength derived from service provision. When rebels expect to survive long enough to realize the benefits of civilian service provision, accepting a peace agreement today based on their present capacity is unlikely to convince rebels to disarm.

## **2 Strategic Stalling and Rebel Commitment Problems: Two Competing Theories**

Previous scholarship has argued that service providing terrorist groups are more likely to have stable talks with the government resulting in cessation of violence (Heger and Jung, 2017). Providing services gives rebels a wider base of civilian support and they are more likely to have a centralized organizational structure, which is further solidified by service provision. Governments find rebel groups with a strong centralized command and control more attractive as negotiating partners, since this organizational trait decreases the probability of spoilers—those who derail peace talks through violence without the approval of the rebel leadership. Service-providing rebels are also expected to be stronger and more capable than other rebels since providing services corresponds to territorial control, greater centralization, and is costly (Kasfir, 2015; Mampilly, 2011; Stewart, 2018; Heger and Jung, 2017; Weinstein, 2007; Kalyvas, 2006, 2015). Stronger rebels are, in turn, more likely to reach a negotiated settlement (Walter, 2009).

Even though the literature suggests a strong *a priori* expectation of a positive relationship between rebel service provision and conflict ending through negotiated settlement, I argue there are at least two possible theories that call this positive relationship into question. The first is rebel strategic stalling, which I argue is necessary to fully glean the benefits of investing in service provision. The second is the rebel side of the commitment problem. That is, rebels' difficulty in committing to not remobilize during negotiations and the implementation of an agreement. However, both quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that rebel strategic stalling is the more likely explanation as to why there is not a positive relationship between rebel service provision and successful negotiated settlements. An overview of these theories is presented in Table 1, including observable implications for each explanation.

**Table 1: Overview of Theories**

<b>Explanation</b>	<b>Observable Implications</b>
<p>Rebel Strategic Stalling</p>	<p>1) Negative relationship between rebel service provision and conflicts ending through a negotiated settlement                  2) Rebels will engage in talks and make ceasefires but delay signing any peace agreement</p>
<p>Rebel Commitment Problem</p>	<p>1) Negative relationship between rebel service provision and conflicts ending through a negotiated settlement                  2) Governments will be wary of signing ceasefires and end the talks due to fears of rebel remobilization</p>
<p>Mitigates rebel commitment problem created by “spoilers” (Heger and Jung, 2017)</p>	<p>1) Positive relationship between rebel service provision and conflicts ending through a negotiated settlement</p>

## 2.1 Rebel Strategic Stalling

The logic of strategic stalling is built off of two assumptions. First, rebels invest their resources in things they believe will help them achieve their goals (Popkin, 1979; Kasfir, 2015). Second, rebel service provision, while perhaps not as cost prohibitive as some may argue (Arjona, 2016, 60), is still costly (Stewart, 2018). Together, these two assumptions imply that when rebels choose to invest in service provision they do so because they believe it will benefit them, in some way and at some point in time. Since rebels, like many organizations, face a budget constraint, investing in service provision naturally implies there is less to invest in military capability (i.e., guns, ammunition, etc.).

Service provision, however, has the potential to benefit rebels immensely. As part of a “winning hearts and minds” strategy ultimately generating loyalty, service provision leads to civilian collaboration (Kalyvas, 2006, 124 and 128). Providing services also legitimizes rebels and their control, particularly for civilians (Ledwidge, 2017; Stewart, 2016). Rebels, much like the state, can use public education to socialize civilians into their ideology (Weber, 1976). Parents in ISIS-controlled Mosul recognized this and consequently, despite the risk of severe punishment, kept their children home instead of sending them to the ISIS-run schools (Lafta, Cetorelli and Burnham, 2018). Rebel groups also recognize this. During an interview with the Kurdish Ministry of Education in Erbil, Iraq, controlled exclusively by Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) until 2006, I was told that “teaching children to love their country [Kurdistan]” was one of the main goals of Kurdish education.<sup>5</sup> In the development of the French state, education was used “to teach children national and patriotic sentiments, explain what the state did for them and why it exacted taxes and military service, and show them their true interest in the fatherland” (Weber, 1976, 332). The “imagined community” of the nation is solidified through state education (Anderson, 2016). Just as state education teaches civilians what legitimizes the government’s authority, rebel education communicates and reinforces rebels’ legitimacy.

But, this is not limited to education. Other services also garner civilian support. They provide an avenue for regularized non-violent interaction with civilians, which is central to winning hearts and minds (Kilcullen, 2011). Healthcare, for example, not only invests in a healthier population from which rebels can recruit, but it also communicates that they care about the health and welfare of civilians. Law and Order provision

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<sup>5</sup>Interview with the General Director of Educational Planning on December 2nd, 2018 in Erbil, Iraq.

builds and reinforces rebel legitimacy, all while undermining the legitimacy of the government (Ledwidge, 2017). Rebel legitimacy and evidence of rebel concern about civilian welfare both lead to increased civilian support for rebels. There are multiple paths—ideology, legitimacy, increasing civilian welfare, and regularized non-violent contact with civilians—through which rebel service provision leads to increased civilian support.

Although service provision provides many benefits, realizing these benefits can take time (Weinstein, 2007, 171). On the one hand, guns, ammunition and military equipment immediately benefit rebels and can alter the balance of power for bargaining today. Service provision, on the other hand, requires time before the full magnitude of its benefits can be realized. Winning hearts and minds requires consistency to prove to civilians that the rebels will be sticking around. In one sense, the benefits are not rooted in the good itself, but in the civilian interaction over time from the service provision (Kilcullen, 2011, 71). Service provision gives rebels with long-time horizons the ability to “[reshape] local life in accordance to its interests, needs, and principles” (Arjona, 2016, 11). Rebel territorial control makes this easier (Kalyvas, 2006, 128), but it is not always necessary (Ledwidge, 2017, 33).

Since rebel service provision is advantageous but requires a longer time horizon, rebels need to survive long enough to realize those benefits. If rebels are unable to survive, then service provision is an unwise investment. This incentivizes rebels to ensure their long-term survival, even at the cost of immediate military advantages. Strategically stalling gives rebels such an opportunity. Peace talks and negotiations are expected to be long, drawn out processes, and in some cases are even accompanied by lulls in fighting. Ceasefires, in particular, signal goodwill on behalf of the rebels and their willingness to negotiate. However, ceasefires also buy rebels time where they can focus on providing services and worry less about government offensive military action. Rebel strategic stalling, then, should be indicated by a negative correlation between conflicts ending through a negotiated settlement and rebel service provision. There should also be evidence of rebel willingness to sign ceasefires and negotiate with the government but without signing final settlements.

## **2.2 Rebel Commitment Problem**

Commitment problems arise when parties cannot credibly commit to upholding the deal they strike today in the face of a power shift tomorrow (Powell, 2006). In the civil war context, when rebels disarm, which is sometimes demanded prior to entering peace talks, it increases the government’s power. Unless governments

can credibly commit to the rebels that they will honor the agreement, rebels will refuse to negotiate or sign a peace agreement. This is why getting rebels to disarm is considered the most important obstacle to overcome to peacefully resolve civil war (Driscoll, 2012). This is the government commitment problem. The other side is the rebel commitment problem. Theoretically, a rebel commitment problem occurs when the rebels decide to remobilize during negotiations or implementation of a settlement (Walter, 2009). Because the power dynamic is generally in favor of the government in civil wars, little has been done to explore the rebel commitment problem.

Rebel service provision affects commitment problems in two ways. First, rebel service provision mobilizes civilians to keep the government accountable, even after they disarm (Huang, 2016). This means that rebel service provision should help mitigate the *government* commitment problem. The second way rebel service provision affects commitment problems is through its ability to generate civilian loyalty and collaboration, and through redefining identities (Kalyvas, 2006; Ledwidge, 2017). As civilians move to genuinely support the rebel cause, rebels can recruit more, and better, fighters. Pools of potential recruits mean rebels retain the ability to remobilize, even if they begin to disarm (Walter, 2004). This is the *rebel* commitment problem. Since service provision, especially over time, solidifies civilian loyalties, rebels face difficulties committing not to remobilize their loyal civilians. If rebel service provision invokes rebel commitment problems then there should, like rebel strategic stalling, be a negative relationship between service providing rebels and successful negotiated settlements. However, rebel commitment problems can be differentiated from strategic stalling because a rebel commitment problem would lead to a negative correlation between service provision and ceasefires since rebels can use ceasefire periods to remobilize. Qualitative evidence in support of a rebel commitment problem includes government statements expressing their concerns about rebels remobilizing or rearming during ceasefires or peace talks.

### **3 Data**

Evaluating the theories outlined above requires data on rebel institutions, which I collected in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset. Existing data on rebel institutions is limited in either the number of rebel groups covered, the number of institutions coded, the time period under consideration, or lacks variation over time. A fuller comparison of the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset to other datasets on rebel governance is available in Appendix A.2. Since the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset includes panel data for the

most extensive list of rebel service provision available, I use it here.

In the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset, rebel institutions were coded using a wide variety of sources including books and articles by anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and journalists, as well as reports from international organizations like the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. These sources were complemented by expert interviews with academics who had done fieldwork on the conflicts and by think tank reports like the International Crisis Group. A sample of the coding notes for the Republic of Chechnya–Russia conflict is included in Appendix A.8. For this rebel group, 16 different sources were used to support coding decisions, and the coding documentation includes quotes to support positive coding for an institution in a given year, as well as for coding the absence of the institution. Some quotes included the dates directly: “It was during the war that the first *shari’a* courts were set up, in April 1995, functioning parallel to the secular ones” (Wood, 2007, 90). In other cases, the dates are inferred from the section the quote is taken from, but the date is not directly included in the quote because it would require citing too much material. In these cases, the date is recorded next to the quote and the source and page number can be used to find the appropriate section. Although many cases exist when an institution was not mentioned, quotes that indicate an institution was not created by the rebels were included whenever possible. For example, quotes stating a rebel group robbed banks or counterfeited currency were used to support the decision to not code for rebel currency.

### **3.1 Main Explanatory Variables: Rebel Service Institutions**

There are a number of possible institutions rebel could choose to create. Previous studies using cross-national data on service aspects of rebel governance have focused heavily on the major service sectors: education, health care, and justice (Heger and Jung, 2017; Huang, 2016; Jung, 2017; Stewart, 2018, 2016). The data I use here covers these major service sectors, as well as other, less common, service institutions. To evaluate the theory here I focus on the five most common rebel service institutions: Education, Health care, Law, Policing, and Justice.

In addition to using the individual rebel service institutions, I also created a new variable for rebel law and order. Since rebel law, policing and justice often work together to facilitate law and order in states, I created a variable, *Law & Order* to capture the combination of these three institutions. This variable is a count from 0 to 3 and indicates, yearly, the number of rebel law and order institutions present. Since rebel groups did

not always create law, policing and justice in the same year, I capture the development (or devolution) of rebel law and order over time.

### **3.2 Outcome Variable: Negotiated Settlements**

The outcome of interest here is whether or not governments and rebels are able to reach a peace deal. There are several different types of negotiated settlements. Ceasefire agreements are between two parties that they will halt active fighting. A ceasefire may or may not include provisions for monitoring or withdrawing forces, but they usually allow rebels to remain armed. Peace agreements, however, usually require rebels to disarm and reintegrate (Walter, 2009). Unlike ceasefires, peace agreements offer some sort of political solution to the conflict issue, which makes them an important step towards achieving peace. Because ceasefires do not require rebels to disarm, they are often easier to reach. Rebels do not have to worry about governments attacking them when they are vulnerable after disarming. Peace agreements are more difficult to reach because both sides must agree to a political solution. Sometimes governments and rebels will sign agreements establishing a framework for peace talks. These agreements, however, are not included here as negotiated settlements because they lack a political solution to the conflict. Since I am interested in negotiated settlements that end conflict, ceasefires are not considered a negotiated settlement here, and I focus instead on peace agreements.

There are two possible measures of peace agreements available from the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010). The first is from the *Outcome* variable which is broken down into six types: 1) Peace Agreement (signed the year the armed conflict ends or in the first year of less than 25 battle deaths); 2) Ceasefire with conflict regulation; 3) Ceasefire; 4) Military victory (broken down by government or rebel victory); 5) No or Low Activity; and 6) Other. Since armed conflict begins and ends by the 25 battle deaths threshold, after an episode of armed conflict begins, a full year of less than 25 deaths marks its end. Every episode has an outcome. Therefore, it is possible for an armed conflict to end with a military victory but the parties sign a peace agreement several years later.<sup>6</sup> Although cases like this are rare, they do occur. This is mostly due to the choice of using a battle death threshold to identify which years an armed conflict is active, and which years it is not. Often, conflict simmers below this threshold.

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<sup>6</sup>In fact, there are two instances of this happening in the Conflict Termination dataset between Chad and the FAP, and Haiti and the military faction of Raoul Cedras.

The other measure of peace agreement, which I use here, codes for a verbal or signed agreement by the major parties of the conflict at any time. The Conflict Termination dataset identifies the year a peace agreement was signed, and this data is used to create a binary variable for whether a peace agreement had been signed in that year or a previous year. The panel for each rebel group ends when the group ends either by 1) disbanding; 2) ceasing to engage in any activity; or 3) renouncing violence and becoming a political party.<sup>7</sup> I consider a negotiated settlement to have failed, and coded as 0, when armed conflict occurs after two years without armed conflict. In cases where a peace agreement is signed but armed conflict continues, a negotiated settlement fails after the fifth year of armed conflict. Successful negotiated settlements are signed peace agreements that lead to a rebel group no longer existing.

### 3.3 Control Variables

Since the data is observational, I control for three categories of potential omitted variables: 1) state-level factors that account for government decision to remain in peace talks and their ability to credibly commit; 2) conflict characteristics that make peace agreements more difficult to reach; and 3) rebel characteristics that might be correlated with the decision to create institutions and with the prospects of peace. A summary of the variables in each category are presented in Table 2.

The first category captures state-level variables that might impact the government's decision to walk away from negotiations for reasons other than the rebels inability to credibly commit. First is the level of participatory democracy.<sup>8</sup> Participatory democracy captures the level of participation in all political processes. Higher participatory democracy indicates norms of engagement and discourse, which should make the government more willing to engage rebels in negotiations, and increase their ability to credibly commit to a peace deal. The other state-level controls are gross domestic product per capita<sup>9</sup>, primary education enrollment ratio<sup>10</sup>, and infant mortality rates<sup>11</sup>. These controls account for government provision of social services, and the rebel's decision to provide services in the first place.

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<sup>7</sup>Conflicts or groups active past 2012 are censored in 2012.

<sup>8</sup>The measure of participatory democracy is from the V-Dem Project. <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-8/>

<sup>9</sup>Maddison Project (Bolt et al., 2018)

<sup>10</sup>UNESCO

<sup>11</sup>World Bank with WHO, UNICEF, and UN DESA Population Division

**Table 2: Summary of control variables at the rebel group, state and conflict levels**

Rebel-level Controls	State-level Controls	Conflict-level Controls
Rebel group size (ln)	Participatory democracy	Yearly battle deaths (ln)
Rebel group strength	GDP per capita	Military victory
Rebel group centralization	Primary enrollment ratio	Mediation attempt
Rebel territorial control	Infant mortality	Territorial conflict
Communist ideology		
Ethnic based		
Foreign State Support for rebels		

The second category of controls are conflict characteristics that impact how difficult a conflict is to resolve. Mediation<sup>12</sup>, which involves the presence of a third-party facilitating discussions between governments and rebels, makes reaching peace agreements easier, while higher battle deaths<sup>13</sup> makes peace agreements more difficult to reach. Military victories<sup>14</sup> captures cases where one side has a clear military superiority, which disincentivizes the winning party from agreeing to a peace deal. Finally, I control for separatist conflicts<sup>15</sup>, which are positively correlated with mediation and with the presence of rebel service institutions.<sup>16</sup> Separatist conflicts are wars where the rebels are fighting for independence or autonomy of a specific territory within the state. They differ from rebel territorial control, which captures when rebels physically control territory. Rebel territorial control can occur even when rebels are not fighting a separatist conflict, and rebels fighting for territory will not necessarily control territory.

Finally, I need to consider potential rebel characteristics that make peace agreements more likely. These variables, which come from the Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2013) and the FORGE dataset (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2019), are discussed in the following section. I include a longer discussion on these variables because to isolate the correlation between negotiated settlements and rebel service provision, I need to control for rebel characteristics that influence their ability to reach a negotiated settlement with the government.

Some rebel groups may possess characteristics that make it easier to achieve a successful negotiated set-

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<sup>12</sup>This is a yearly, binary variable for whether mediation was attempted in a given year coded from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Version 2.0).

<sup>13</sup>PRIO, (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005)

<sup>14</sup>UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010)

<sup>15</sup>UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010)

<sup>16</sup>See Table 3. Megan Stewart (2018) finds a positive correlation between rebel services and separatist conflicts.

tlement. Stronger rebels who can continue the armed struggle, cause greater damage to the government or mobilize the population might give the government greater incentives to negotiate and settle (Walter, 2009; Clayton, 2013). Rebels with stronger command and control over their soldiers to deter defectors and spoilers are also more likely to reach a settlement (Heger and Jung, 2017; Cunningham, 2011). Others have argued that separatist conflicts are more difficult to resolve (Fearon, 2004; Fuhrmann and Tir, 2009), and other rebel characteristics, like ethnicity-based rebel groups or communist rebels might impact the capability of reaching a settlement (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2015).

The literature has found that as rebels approach parity with the government, mediation and negotiated settlements are much more likely (Mason and Fett, 1996; Regan and Michael Greig, 2008; Zartman, 1989). This finding is in line with the analysis using the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset. I ran a linear regression model with these variables and a cubic time polynomial to see the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The results are presented in Table 3. Rebel strength relative to the government, a categorical variable, is set with the base category as “much weaker.” Therefore, increasing in rebel strength from “much weaker” relative to the government, to “parity,” “stronger” and “much stronger,” are all positive and significant. Only eleven rebel groups, out of the 235 rebel groups in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset, are categorized by the Non-State Actor data as being stronger than the government at some point in time.<sup>17</sup> There are 31 groups that are categorized as having parity with the government, which means that the overwhelming majority of groups are weaker than the government. The positive and statistically significant coefficients mean that stronger rebels are more likely to reach a successful negotiated settlement.

Rebel groups with a communist ideology, or those fighting for territory (autonomy or independence) are both less likely to reach a negotiated settlement, which is consistent with previous studies (Fearon, 2004; Fuhrmann and Tir, 2009; Balcells and Kalyvas, 2015). The natural log of rebel group size and level of rebel centralized command and control, however, are both insignificant.

## **4 Rebel Services and Successful Negotiated Settlements**

To test the argument that service provision creates an incentive for rebels to stall, there should be a negative correlation between rebel services and a conflict ending with a negotiated settlement. I used panel data with

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<sup>17</sup>This includes groups categorized as ‘stronger’ and ‘much stronger’ by the Non-state Actor data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2013).

**Table 3: Likelihood of a Negotiated Settlement**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Negotiated Settlement		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Centralization	0.008 (0.177)		
Rebel size (ln)		-0.038 (0.129)	
Rebel strength: weaker			0.472 (0.320)
Rebel strength: parity			1.794*** (0.402)
Rebel strength: stronger			1.849** (0.733)
Rebel strength: much stronger			3.560** (1.445)
Ethnic rebel group	0.092 (0.282)	0.418 (0.326)	0.009 (0.292)
Communist rebel group	-1.487*** (0.393)	-1.233*** (0.427)	-1.301*** (0.404)
Separatist conflict	-1.201*** (0.327)	-1.240*** (0.394)	-0.853** (0.344)
Observations	1,794	1,609	1,808

*Note: Cubic time polynomial included.* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard errors clustered by rebel group. Logistic regression.  
Base category for rebel strength is 'much weaker.'

a count variable for each rebel service that counts the number of years rebels have provided that service. There should be an institutional effect of these services where their impact increases the longer they have been provided. Rebel education, for example, should have a stronger effect on civilian support if it has been provided for a decade than in the first year it is provided. Any break longer than two years restarts the count.

Due to high correlation between the different services I run individual models for each service, and a model using a yearly count variable for the top five services and one for all services. These yearly count variables reflect how many services the rebels provided in a given year. These variables count by institution, rather than over the years like the individual service count variables. A cubic time polynomial is added to account for the panel nature of the data.

Table 4 presents the results the from linear regression models.<sup>18</sup> Models 1-5 use the service count variables, and the count over time variable for education, health, law, policing and justice rebel services. The coefficients are all negative; however, education, law and justice are also statistically significant. Although the coefficients are small, -0.001 to -0.005, they represent the change for each additional year of rebel service provision. The top five services and the all services yearly counts, presented in Models 6 and 7, are also both negative and statistically significant.

The results show a negative correlation between rebel services and a conflict ending with a negotiated settlement even when considering different services and combinations of them. Robustness checks in Appendix A.4 use event analysis where the event is signing an agreement, rather than ending the conflict, and the substantive results are similar to those in Table 4. Appendix A.5 also includes models using the other institutions. Table A.3 presents the results for rebel border patrols, joining an international organization, diplomatic missions abroad, elections, constitutions and currency. Table A.4 present the results for three forms of rebel government: parallel, government-in-exile, and local.

These results, however, are opposite of those found with terrorist group service provision (Heger and Jung, 2017). There are several possible explanations for this divergence. First, there is only some overlap between

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<sup>18</sup>Results from linear regression models were used because I wanted to included year fixed effects, and logistic regression models with the high number of variables and fixed effects had difficulty converging. However, linear regression produces similar coefficients to a logistic regression.

terrorist groups and rebel groups: I matched 75 groups between Heger and Jung's Terrorist and Insurgent Organizations Social Services (TIOS) data and my Rebel Quasi-State Institutions data. Another possible explanation is that there are differences in either the conceptualization of the services, or in the coding procedures. A more detailed discussion and analysis of this is presented in Appendix [A.6](#).

**Table 4: Linear Regression results for service count variables**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Negotiated Settlement						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Education count	-0.001*						
	(0.001)						
Health count		-0.001					
		(0.001)					
Law count			-0.002**				
			(0.001)				
Police count				-0.0004			
				(0.0004)			
Justice count					-0.001*		
					(0.0004)		
Services top 5 count (yearly)						-0.005*	
						(0.003)	
All services count (yearly)							-0.005***
							(0.002)
Battle deaths (ln)	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.003*	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mediation	0.052**	0.055**	0.060***	0.054**	0.053**	0.055**	0.059***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Separatist conflict	-0.014	-0.016*	-0.014	-0.016*	-0.018*	-0.016*	-0.017*

*Continued on next page*



While these results suggest that previous expectations regarding the relationship of rebel service provision and negotiated settlements are incorrect, they do not allow us to differentiate between a rebel commitment problem and a stalling explanation. However, these two explanations have different expectations of how episodes of armed conflict end. On the one hand, a rebel commitment problem arising from rebel service provision would lead to government unwillingness to come to any agreement, including a ceasefire, with the rebels. Breaks in fighting, then, would be the result of low activity by both sides. Stalling, on the other hand, would lead rebels to value ceasefires. Since a rebel group can remain armed and active while continuing to provide services amidst lightened military expectations during a ceasefire, they are advantageous for rebels.

I collapsed the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions data into a rebel group-episode unit of analysis, based on the episodic years provided by UCDP. Yearly control variables were averaged for each episode. I ran a multinomial logit regression using the following episode outcome types: Peace Agreement, Ceasefire, Government Military Victory, Rebel Military Victory, Low Activity, and Other. The peace agreement outcome requires that the agreement provides a political solution to the conflict and must be signed within two years of when the episode ends. Ceasefires include those agreed to by both parties and may or may not include conflict regulation protocols. Low activity captures the cases where there is no formal end to the episode, rather there is at least one year where there were less than 25 battle-related deaths (Kreutz, 2010).

The results for the multinomial logit models are presented in Table 5. Each row represents a separate model run with the same set of control variables. Ceasefire is the baseline category. This means that for *Education count*, which is number of years the rebels provided education during that episode, each outcome listed is compared to the chances of ending in a ceasefire. The comparison of interest is Low Activity, presented in column 2. The negative sign on the coefficient means that as the number of years rebels provide services increases, the chances of the episode ending with a ceasefire are higher compared to ending with low activity. However, only the education model produces a statistically significant coefficient. As another robustness check, the comparison between ending with a ceasefire compared to a peace agreement is also negative. This means that as the number of years rebels provide services increases, ending in a peace agreement is less likely relative to ending with a ceasefire. Although none of these coefficients are statistically significant, they are consistent substantively with the results in Table 4.

**Table 5: Multinomial Logit Results Comparing Outcomes to Ceasefires**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Peace Agreement (1)	Low Activity (2)	Government Victory (3)	Rebel Victory (4)	Other (5)
Education count	-0.147 (0.093)	-0.119* (0.071)	-0.524 (0.399)	-0.078 (0.170)	-0.038 (0.091)
Health count	-0.142 (0.105)	-0.082 (0.072)	-0.245 (0.252)	-0.226 (0.212)	-0.031 (0.093)
Law count	-0.021 (0.087)	-0.006 (0.075)	0.222 (0.165)	0.434 (0.403)	-0.010 (0.133)
Policing count	-0.005 (0.083)	-0.043 (0.077)	0.304 (0.197)	-0.354 (0.276)	-0.043 (0.113)
Justice count	-0.082 (0.079)	-0.082 (0.070)	-0.028 (0.149)	-0.007 (0.191)	-0.077 (0.086)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	550.700	550.700	550.700	550.700	550.700

*Note: Base category is ceasefire. Each service was run separately with same controls. Controls included but not reported: episode duration, number of foreign supporters, average GDP per capita, separatist conflicts, average primary education enrollment ratio, average infant mortality rate, average GDP per capita, separatist conflicts, average number of mediation attempts, average battle deaths, communist ideology, ethnic rebel group, average level of rebel centralization, rebel territorial control, rebel strength, and average rebel size.*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 5 Peace Processes in Colombia and Northern Ireland

The negative correlation between rebel service provision and successful negotiated settlements reveal that the argument that service provision reinforces centralization and prevents spoilers, and therefore increases the likelihood of negotiated settlements is not supported. And while the multinomial logit results showing the positive and statistically significant correlation between ceasefires and rebel service provision, relative to low activity, lends support in favor of the strategic stalling mechanism over a rebel commitment problem, they are still correlations. Therefore, I supplement the results above with qualitative evidence on the negotiations that occurred between the Colombian government and the FARC between 1998 and 2002, and the British government and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) between 1972 and 1976.

These cases were selected for two reasons. First, they should be difficult cases for the theory proposed because they possessed several qualities that the literature argues should make negotiated settlements more likely. Both groups were centralized and growing in military strength during the time periods in question (Hennessey, 2015, 8). And although the FARC eventually reached a peace agreement with the Colombian government, it was after 2012 and therefore not a positive case of negotiated settlement in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions data. The PIRA did, however, reach a peace agreement in 1998, and formally dissolved in 2005, making it a positive case of negotiated settlement. The FARC and the PIRA also differed in their goals. While the FARC was looking to control the central government in Colombia, the PIRA wanted to separate from the United Kingdom and join Ireland.

Second, negotiations are complex with many different factors at play; however, the results in the preceding sections suggest that, on average, rebel service provision is negatively correlated with successful negotiated settlements. Commitment problems can arise from the government or the rebel side through different mechanisms, but rebel service provision should only have a negative impact on negotiated settlements through a rebel commitment problem. Therefore, I need to control, as best as possible, for the government commitment problem, which could still be present during negotiations. PIRA and the FARC are both ideal cases to do this because during the negotiation periods I examine, the government did not require either group to disarm. In fact, in the case of the FARC, the Colombian government even granted them full control<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>At least in a military sense. A number of state officials, all unarmed, remained. However, the Colombian military and security personnel all withdrew from the demilitarized zone in 1998.

of a sizable piece of territory. In civil war, the main source of a government commitment problem is that rebels are expected to disarm, which the British and Colombian governments did not demand during the negotiations. Since I am attempting to isolate the rebel side of the commitment problem, using cases where the government commitment problem is limited allows for a better examination of the rebel side.

## **5.1 Who walked away from the negotiations?**

To help distinguish between the two proposed mechanisms—strategic stalling and the rebel commitment problem—I first consider who walked away from the negotiations. If a rebel commitment problem is driving the negative correlation then there should be evidence of the government ending negotiations amidst fears of rebel regrouping, specifically related to the rebels’ service provision. Strategic stalling, however, would reveal a pattern of rebels walking away from negotiations but only temporarily. In the case of the PIRA, they declared a number of unilateral ceasefires between 1972 and 1976. The British government stated that the Army would be rolled back in response to genuine evidence of a cessation of violence, and that other practices, like photographing, Interim Custody orders, and searches, would also be discontinued (TNA, 1975*b*). This was not simply propaganda on the part of the government, British intentions of reducing the Army presence in Northern Ireland in response to a cessation of PIRA violence are confirmed through secret, internal documents (TNA, 1974). The PIRA, in exchange for the ceasefire, made it clear they expected to see concessions from the British government, like an end to internment, releasing political detainees, or a public statement regarding British intentions of eventually leaving Northern Ireland. These ceasefires, however, were unilateral and therefore the PIRA ended them<sup>20</sup> stating the process was not moving quickly enough, citing violations by the British Army or complaining that too few prisoners were released. The British government, however, continued talks with the PIRA, sometimes through intermediaries and other times directly with PIRA representatives (TNA, 1975*a*; Hennessey, 2015).

Promises of successful negotiations with the FARC won Andrés Pastrana the Colombian presidency (Isacson and Rodriguez, 2009, 23). In an effort to get the FARC to the negotiation table, in 1998 Pastrana offered a demilitarized zone roughly the size of Switzerland for the FARC to control in exchange for sitting down at the negotiation table (Braun, 2007, 30). The military, which was withdrawn from the demilitarized zone, did

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<sup>20</sup>Since they were unilateral ceasefires, technically the British Army was not a party to them and hence the ceasefires could only end by the PIRA’s choice.

not support Pastrana's decision to grant the FARC territorial control and believed the FARC would use the territory to expand and launch military operations (Kline, 2007, 54-5). These concerns were valid and during the time period where the demilitarized zone was in place, the FARC grew to its peak membership, launched military operations and established extensive governance and service provision (Kline, 2007; Dudley, 2004; Nasi, 2009; Beittel, 2015). However, despite evidence that the FARC was growing in strength and mobilizing during the negotiations, the FARC "froze" the peace talks four times between 1998 and 2002. Additionally, when Pastrana did eventually end negotiations it was attributed, not to the FARC growth from their service provision, but because the FARC hijacked a plane and kidnapped a senator, landing in the demilitarized zone. After the FARC refused to hand over the hijacker, Pastrana ordered the military to retake the demilitarized zone (Kline, 2007). Similar to the case of the PIRA, the peace talks with the FARC lend support for strategic stalling over a rebel commitment problem. While the Colombian military was clearly concerned with FARC growth and a power shift during these talks, ultimately, it was Pastrana who controlled whether or not the government would negotiate with the FARC. Despite evidence that FARC growth did occur, it was a high-profile act of violence, not concerns over increasing strength from FARC service provision in the demilitarized zone that led to the demise of the peace talks.

## 5.2 Concerns over Service Provision

Another way to distinguish between strategic stalling and rebel commitment problems is by looking at how rebels and governments treated service provision. If rebel service provision was generating fears of rebel growth and regrouping then the government should be expressing concern regarding rebel service provision. If rebels are stalling then rebel statements and actions should reveal continued rebel service provision during the negotiations, and evidence that they valued such provision. In the case of the PIRA, British comments regarding PIRA service provision, which was mostly justice and policing, are limited. However, in both internal memos (Hennessey, 2015, 178-9) and parliamentary statements, the British government states that sustained cessation of violence includes ending "bombings, murders and kneecappings...[and] kangaroo courts..." (TNA, 1975b). However, the British government also assessed that PIRA activities were costing them Catholic support while support for the British had been increasing (TNA, 1975c).<sup>21</sup>

Even though it appears that the British recognized that the PIRA needed these ceasefires, particularly in

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<sup>21</sup>Also see Hennessey (2015), p 182-4.

1974-5, to regroup and regain civilian support, and recognized the possibility existed that the PIRA could come back stronger (Wilkin, 1975; Hennessey, 2015), the British still remained intent on trying to make the ceasefire last (TNA, 1974). The PIRA's actions during the ceasefire, including reintroducing auxiliary units believed to be for community policing (Wilkin, 1975), suggest they were using the ceasefire to repair the damage done to their Catholic support. The PIRA also stated the British government was preventing them from protecting their people (Hennessey, 2015, 197). This supports PIRA stalling. The British government<sup>22</sup>, however, shows no concern that the PIRA's activities during the ceasefire would dangerously shift power in favor of the PIRA. Classified internal reports from the British Army in Northern Ireland outline PIRA activity during the ceasefire, which included training and acquiring weapons (Wilkin, 1975). The British government also recorded PIRA violations of their ceasefire, and in a classified internal document, discuss using these publicly but note that “[i]t is easy enough to see the reason for not using [the PIRA violations] at all, notably the difficulty of reconciling them with the publicly stated reasons for continuing to release detainees during the past few months” (TNA, 1975a, 2). Despite PIRA activity during the ceasefire, the British government continued releasing PIRA political prisoners. Clearly, the negotiations with the PIRA did not break down because of British government fears that PIRA service provision was increasing the capability and support of the group.

FARC's control of the demilitarized zone gave them free rein to provide services, which they did. Much like the British government, the Colombian government appears to have viewed the FARC's service provision only in the context of the military advantage that it could bring. When Pastrana declared the end of negotiations with the FARC, he added that, in addition to the increase in “terrorist acts” there were other activities like the FARC's infrastructure development (roads, bridges and an airstrip) which were for “illicit purposes” (Kline, 2007, 120).<sup>23</sup> The FARC issued a communique in response stating that they built infrastructure because the Colombian government failed to do so when it was in control of the territory and restated their commitment to the struggle of the people (Kline, 2007, 121-2). In this case, the Colombian government

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<sup>22</sup>This does not include the British Army, which did express concerns over the PIRA militarily regrouping. However, this does not support a rebel commitment problem from service provision for two reasons. First, their concern was clearly due to military activity such as weapons shipments and training, not because of PIRA service provision. Second, the British government, not the Army, was the one who had the authority to sign a peace agreement (Wilkin, 1975; Hennessey, 2015).

<sup>23</sup>Also see Dudley 2004, 172.

did not appear concerned over FARC service provision suggesting there was not a rebel commitment problem. The FARC's service provision during the negotiations, however, supports the theory of FARC strategic stalling.

### **5.3 Rebel Political Parties**

The final area where the rebel commitment problem and strategic stalling theories diverge is in the government's openness to the rebels participating in elections while providing services and remaining armed. If a rebel commitment problem is driving the negative correlation between service provision and successful negotiated settlements then governments should be actively preventing rebel inclusion in the political process while rebels are providing services. Rebel service provision should increase their electoral prospects, which would in turn increase their bargaining position during negotiations. Strategic stalling, however, should produce the opposite: rebels, if allowed by the government, should engage in the political system and run in elections.

The PIRA's political party, Sinn Féin, was proscribed in 1956, but British authorities legalized it in May 1974, during the period of talks with the PIRA. The British government convened a Constitutional Convention, with elected members, in 1975 to discuss the political options for Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin was allowed to run in this election but chose not to (TNA, [1975a](#), 6). Additionally, Sinn Féin had a policy of boycotting their seats and it was a number of years later, in 1983, when they discontinued their policy of abstention. This suggests that a rebel commitment problem was not why the talks with the PIRA broke down; however, Sinn Féin's reluctance to engage in the electoral process in Northern Ireland is not affirmation of PIRA stalling.

The FARC, however, provides better support for strategic stalling in regards to their political party. Their first political party, the Unión Patriótica (UP) was formed in 1984, following the Uribe Agreement. This agreement established a framework through which the FARC and the Colombian government would proceed to negotiate, and it had two important implications. First, the FARC was not expected to disarm. Second, the agreement paved the way for the FARC to enter mainstream politics (Dudley, [2004](#), 46). Unfortunately, the UP became the target for the FARC's enemies. Alberto Rojas Poyu, a UP member, told Steven Dudley "Maybe the army wasn't able to finish off the guerrillas, but it was capable of finishing off the membership of the [UP]...They [the FARC and Communist Party]...made the UP an easy target for assassins" (Dudley,

2004, 95). While the UP was targeted by paramilitaries and drug cartels, the Colombian government did not block UP electoral participation, and the UP won seats in 1986 and 1988 (Beittel, 2015, 3).

The UP was also targeted by some within the Colombian security forces. Although this seems contradictory, it is important to remember that governments are not unitary actors. In the case of Colombia during the Pastrana presidency, there was contention between the Colombian presidency, who had the power to negotiate and sign an agreement, and the security forces. This mitigates concerns that the Colombian government allowed the UP to run in elections but then ordered the security forces to eliminate them. The power struggle between the Colombian presidency and the security forces was public and continual. In 1984, mere days before the Uribe Agreement was signed, General Landazábal gave an interview stating that there would be no ceasefire with the FARC. After the Uribe Agreement, General Landazábal began a media campaign to turn public support against the FARC (Dudley, 2004, 39-43).<sup>24</sup> The Colombian government, however, still allowed the FARC's political party, the UP, to run in elections, which the UP did. Even though the UP was targeted for assassinations, the fact they ran in elections supports strategic stalling.

Overall, evidence from the PIRA and the FARC cases on who ended negotiations, how the government reacted to rebel service provision and rebel involvement in elections, lends support for a stalling mechanism over a rebel commitment problem. Both the PIRA and FARC stalled negotiations by temporarily walking away, but remained open to dialogue with the government, which supports the stalling explanation. A rebel commitment problem would lead the government, not rebels, to end negotiations, which was not observed in the PIRA case. And, although Colombian President Pastrana did eventually end negotiations with the FARC, it occurred after a major incident: hijacking a plane and kidnapping a senator. The FARC had spent three years providing services in the demilitarized zone but Pastrana attributed the end of the negotiations to the FARC's 'terrorist' activity, which includes the military use of FARC infrastructure, rather than their mobilization of civilians through service provision. Additionally, throughout the peace talks, the FARC froze the process four separate times, but continued to state their willingness to continue negotiations with the government (Arenas, 1990; Kline, 2007, 121-2), which supports strategic stalling.

The lack of concern the British and Colombian governments had in regards to the PIRA and FARC service provision also supports stalling over a rebel commitment problem. In fact, the British acknowledged that

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<sup>24</sup>Also, at one point during peace talks in 2002, the FARC claimed the government ended talks because the military demanded it (Kline, 2007, 121).

the PIRA was using the ceasefires to regain support, but continued its policy of attempting to keep the ceasefire from breaking down by, for example, releasing detainees. The FARC and the PIRA, however, stated that they provided services to assist civilians. And, while the PIRA did not directly state this, the British government assessed that the PIRA's decision to declare a ceasefire was to regain Catholic support they had lost. Additionally, both groups were given the opportunity to run candidates in elections, which we would not expect to see if there was a rebel commitment problem. While PIRA's electoral behavior is not positive support for the stalling mechanism, it does not appear to support the rebel commitment problem mechanism. The FARC's participation in elections does, however, support strategic stalling over a rebel commitment problem.

## 6 Conclusion

Rebels invest in service provision, diverting resources which could be used to improve their military capability, because they believe that service provision will benefit them. A burgeoning literature on rebel governance confirms this. Service provision wins civilian hearts and minds, which over time translates into collaboration (Kalyvas, 2006), and can enhance a rebel groups' legitimacy and ability to organize civilians (Coggins, 2015; Arjona, 2014, 2016). Rebel institutional capacity is a source of strength, albeit different than military capacity. However, in civil war, which is an armed struggle over the right to govern, institutional capacity is also important. It may not directly enhance rebels' fighting capacity, but it is directly beneficial in legitimizing their claims of governing, which can in turn increase support and lead to greater rebel capacity. Then, as the literature has suggested, rebels who provide services over time should be more likely to reach and successfully end a conflict with a negotiated settlement (Heger and Jung, 2017).

However, despite a strong *a priori* expectation of a positive relationship, the results here suggest that, on average, the relationship is actually negative. This finding challenges not only the theoretical expectations regarding the relationship between rebel capacity and settlements, but also the state of available rebel institutions data. The data used here expands what was previously available on several dimensions: the number of rebel groups, number of institutions, time frame of groups covered, and length of time each rebel group is coded.<sup>25</sup> It provides a way for future research to continue exploring the implications of rebel institutions

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<sup>25</sup>The Rebel Quasi-State Institutions data expands on at least one dimension other available datasets. For example, the Terrorist and Insurgent Organization Social Services dataset covers over 400 terrorist groups,

on civil war and peace.

I have argued here that there are two possible theoretical explanations why rebel service provision does not have a positive effect on ending civil conflict through negotiated settlements. The first is that the benefits of service provision are not immediate and consequently, rebels stall to increase the dividends of their investment. This incentivizes rebel stalling, particularly through negotiations. The second possible explanation is that service provision, which can increase civilian support, creates a rebel commitment problem, instilling government fears that rebels are using ceasefires and peace talks to regroup through their increased civilian support. Commitment problems are well-established in the conflict literature (Powell, 1999, 2006; Walter, 2002); however, a survey of negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC, and the British government and the PIRA suggest that rebel commitment problems are unlikely to be causing the negative correlation revealed here. Rather, the evidence, while not direct proof, does suggest that rebels will stall through negotiations to reap the benefits of their service provision.

The implications of this paper, however, reach beyond theory and data contributions. Ending a conflict with a negotiated settlement is incredibly difficult, but the human cost of continued conflict is much steeper. Policy-makers and negotiators need to understand how different forms of rebel capacity, particularly institutional forms of capacity, create different incentives than military capacity. Expectations of future benefits from an investment in service provision will lead to rebel stalling in negotiations. This, however, does not necessarily mean rebels will never be willing to sign an agreement. It simply means that rebels may expect to get a better deal in the future, so they will delay signing a peace agreement. Mediators and policy-makers, therefore, need to consider how to make a settlement more attractive today to off-set the expected future gain from rebel service provision, and seriously consider the state of government service provision. State investment in services can undermine rebel support, thereby decreasing rebel expectations about the gains from their service provision.

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around a quarter of which are also UCDP rebel groups, but starts coding in 1970, not 1945.

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# Online Appendix

## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Strategic Stalling and Rebel Commitment Problems: Two Competing Theories</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1	Rebel Strategic Stalling . . . . .	6
2.2	Rebel Commitment Problem . . . . .	7
<b>3</b>	<b>Data</b>	<b>8</b>
3.1	Main Explanatory Variables: Rebel Service Institutions . . . . .	9
3.2	Outcome Variable: Negotiated Settlements . . . . .	10
3.3	Control Variables . . . . .	11
<b>4</b>	<b>Rebel Services and Successful Negotiated Settlements</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Peace Processes in Colombia and Northern Ireland</b>	<b>21</b>
5.1	Who walked away from the negotiations? . . . . .	22
5.2	Concerns over Service Provision . . . . .	23
5.3	Rebel Political Parties . . . . .	25
<b>6</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Appendix</b>	<b>37</b>
A.1	Rebel Quasi-State Institutions Dataset Variables . . . . .	37
A.1.1	Institutions . . . . .	37
A.1.2	Other Variables . . . . .	40
A.2	Data on Rebel Governance . . . . .	41
A.3	Mediation, Armed Conflict Outcomes and Service Provision . . . . .	43
A.4	Robustness Check . . . . .	43
A.5	Other Institutions and Successful Negotiated Settlements . . . . .	48
A.6	Terrorists, Rebels and Service Provision . . . . .	52
A.7	Rebel Quasi-State Institutions Dataset . . . . .	55
A.7.1	Five most common rebel service institutions . . . . .	55
A.8	Sample Coding for the Republic of Chechnya . . . . .	55

## List of Figures

A.1	Number of years of attempted mediation, separated by provider categories . . . . .	44
A.2	Number of rebel groups with each outcome type, separated by their social service provision . . . . .	45

## List of Tables

1	Overview of Theories . . . . .	5
2	Summary of control variables at the rebel group, state and conflict levels . . . . .	12
3	Likelihood of a Negotiated Settlement . . . . .	14

4	Linear Regression results for service count variables	17
5	Multinomial Logit Results Comparing Outcomes to Ceasefires	20
A.1	Overview of Existing Rebel Governance Datasets	42
A.2	Linear regression results for year negotiated settlement signed	47
A.3	Linear regression results of political institutions on negotiated settlements	49
A.4	Linear regression of rebel government types on negotiated settlements	51
A.5	Crosstabs of Cronin's negotiations variable and rebel service provision	53
A.6	Regression of stable negotiations on service count	53
A.7	Regression results of Rebel QSI service provision on TIOS service variables (Heger and Jung, 2017)	54

## A Appendix

### A.1 Rebel Quasi-State Institutions Dataset Variables

The following is a brief description of the variables included in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset. For a full description including coding rules, please see the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions codebook.

#### A.1.1 Institutions

**Government:** This occurs when rebels create a system of government, either at the local or national level. It is further broken down into parallel, government-in-exile and local government. A parallel government is a national-level governing body that claims authority as the legitimate government of the state. A government-in-exile occurs when a parallel government does not reside in the state they claim. Local government is political administration set up at the local level without a national-level, or overarching, government body external to the rebel group coordinating the local bodies. The government variable covers all three forms.

**Organized like a Government:** This variable captures when a rebel group organizes itself with departments like those found in a state. For example, if a rebel group creates an internal legislature and has departments for education or health, it is considered to be organized like a government.

**Attempt to Join International Organization (IO):** This variable captures when a rebel group attempts to join an international organization. The purpose of this variable to capture failed attempts of engaging in the international system.

**Join International Organization (IO):** This variable captures the years when a rebel group is a member of an international organization. An international organization can be comprised of other entities that are not formally recognized as independent states.

**Border Patrol:** This variable occurs when rebels create a special unit dedicated to patrolling an established boundary or border. The “border” must be a set boundary that is continually patrolled, not a road or passage rebels guard to ensure safe transport.

**Constitution:** This variable captures when a rebel group writes a constitution. To be considered a constitution, it must meet one of the conditions used to identify state constitutions: 1) It must declare itself to be the highest law of the land; 2) It must establish a government; or 3) The document identifies itself as the constitution (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, 2009).

**Elections:** This variable captures when rebels hold elections for civilian government positions. These elections can be local, for village-level governing positions, or national, like elections for a President or Prime Minister. The elections must be for civilian governing positions and allow at least some non-rebel civilians to vote. It does not include elections for civilian representation within the rebel group, or elections exclusively for rebel members for rebel leadership positions.

**Diplomatic Efforts Abroad (Embassy):** This variable captures when rebels send representatives abroad to engage with foreign government officials or politicians. It can include embassies and consulates; however, offices opened to engage solely with diaspora members are not counted. Additionally, since diplomatic efforts might not be reciprocated, this variable does not require formal recognition by the foreign state. However, there must be clear evidence that the rebel group representatives abroad attempt to engage with foreign government officials or politicians.

**Identification Documents (IDs):** This variable captures when rebels create identification documents for civilians (not rebel group members). It includes passports and identification cards.

**Political Party:** This variable captures when a rebel group creates a separate political party (not a political wing) that engages in the political process of the existing state. It does not have to be considered a legal political party by the government, stand in elections or take the seats it wins, but it does have to engage as an opposition party in the political scene of the state. This does not include cases where the rebel group holds its own elections and runs. Additionally, the political party must be a separate entity from the rebel group, but be created by the rebel group and connected to the rebel leadership. Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland is a well-known example of the political parties this variable captures.

**Media:** This variable captures when the rebel group has a media outlet through which they publish or report information.

**Currency:** This variable captures when rebels print their own currency. It does not require that the currency be successfully circulated.

**Taxation:** This variable captures when the rebel group taxes civilians or civilian businesses. It includes customs taxes for goods coming across a rebel border, taxes paid in food or supplies by civilians, and income or wartime taxes. While not every civilian must be taxed, the taxation must be group-initiated and fund the group at some level. This excludes cases where individual soldiers impose civilian payments that remain with soldiers who collect it.

**Negotiate Resources:** This variable captures when the rebel group negotiates the rights to extract a natural resource, or an agreement to share a natural resource.

**Economic Treaty:** This variable captures when rebels sign an economic treaty or trade agreement with another state. However, I do not require that the government be internationally recognized.

**Education:** This variable captures rebel created or directed education for civilians. The education must include basic skills like reading, writing or arithmetic, or professional skills like a teaching college. It does not include cases where only the rebel soldiers receive education, or the education is solely rebel-group propaganda or history (often called political education). The education may be provided to children or adults.

**Health:** This variable captures when rebels provide health services for civilians. It may include medicine, health clinics or hospitals, or providing doctors in villages. The health services are not limited to western medicine and local forms like witch doctors are counted as long as the services are provided by the rebel group. I also include health education in this variable, rather than the education variable.

**Welfare/Aid:** This variable captures when rebels provide welfare or aid to civilians. This may be done in response to a natural disaster, or an enemy attack, and it may take a variety of forms like food, money, or agricultural aid (seeds, oxen, plows, etc.).

**Housing:** This variable captures when rebels assist with providing civilians with housing. It may include building or repairing housing, or assigning civilians to abandoned houses.

**Infrastructure:** This variable captures rebel provided infrastructure and includes building or repairing roads, bridges, wells, or community buildings (orphanages, libraries, etc.) It also includes providing electricity, water, sewage, or trash collection.

**Public Transportation:** This variable captures bus, shuttle or other transportation services for civilians. While the transportation does not need to be free, it must be a service available for civilians.

**Justice:** This variable captures rebel justice systems, which includes courts, prisons, and enforcement of judicial decisions. It must be a civilian service. That is, it must have jurisdiction over civilian disputes or crimes. Cases where rebel groups allow civilians to make complaints only against rebel soldiers are not included.

**Law:** This variable captures when rebels establish laws over civilian behavior. It does not include cases of land redistribution.

**Police:** This variable captures rebel policing provided for intra-civilian relations. While the police may also provide security from enemy attacks, they must also provide policing for the civilians within the village or city.

**Constituency Politics:** This variable captures when rebels hear civilian complaints or issues with the current government administration and lobby on behalf of the civilians to the state bureaucracy.

**Armed Forces:** This variable captures the presence of a professional and conventional military force. Conventional forces include aircraft, naval vessels, or mechanized weaponry like tanks. Professional forces means there must be some rebel group members who are not considered members of the armed forces of the group (or the group's government). Both of these conditions must be met for this variable to be coded.

**Other Political, Other Economic, Other Social:** These three variables capture any political, economic or social institutions that are not captured by the other institution variables. Although only a few cases were noted, examples are the creation of postage stamps and mail systems, and intelligence sharing agreements.

**Other Military:** This variable captures any military institution that is not included in the armed forces variable. The most common was the creation of military training programs. These were only counted when the training was conducted by the rebel group itself, not cases where a foreign state or another rebel group provided training.

### **A.1.2 Other Variables**

**Illegal Network:** This variable captures when rebels engage in illicit trade, smuggling or black market sales. Common examples include drug trafficking; however, this variable does not require that the item being traded or sold be contraband (illegal or illicit). For example, rebels might smuggle diamonds, which are not illegal items, but the smuggling of them is. This variable differs from the negotiating natural resources variable because the rebels are not working with a legitimate business, but instead are using the black market. Small arms sales were not included because this is overwhelmingly a method for arming themselves, rather than a income activity for rebels.

**Existence:** This variable captures the years when the rebel group existed as a rebel group. It does not require yearly violence, provided the rebel group eventually causes at least 25 deaths. Rebel groups exist until they are officially disbanded, become a legitimate political party that renounces violence, or become the government. If a rebel institution is found after the group claims to disband, the group still exists as long as the institution is found. Any cases where it was unclear whether the rebel group still exists were coded missing.

**In Power:** This variable codes for the years when the rebel group is in power. This variable is useful in cases where the rebel group wins a civil war but is later defeated and fights again. Identifying years the group was in power distinguishes the years with no institutions because the rebel group was the government, from years where the group existed but did not have an institution.

**Flag:** This variable codes for rebel group flags.

## A.2 Data on Rebel Governance

Collecting data on rebel governance is a significant undertaking. Consequently, existing datasets on rebel governance have limited their scope by limiting the number of institutions or groups coded, or by not including a time dimension. Table A.1 provides a summary of the available datasets on rebel governance, to the best of the author's knowledge.<sup>26</sup> Each dataset was collected as part of a project examining different questions related to rebel governance. This table provides an overview of available data.

I want to briefly discuss two limitations with the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset compared to other datasets. The first is that while the Rebel QSI data is time-variant, it does not capture locality variation. In order to make the coding project manageable, I decided to trade-off large-N cross-national data for locality data. It is important to note that variation exists in the locations of rebel institutions (Arjona, 2016, 123ff). However, I decided to focus on gathering cross-national data on rebel institutions, rather than in-group variation, because the field is still lacking a well-defined picture of what rebel institutions exist. Second, unlike Stewart's (2018) Insurgent Social Services Provision data, the Rebel QSI data *only* codes for inclusive goods. Since the goal was to identify rebel institutions that mimic state institutions, I decided to limit data collection to inclusive institutions. Since state institutions are normatively thought to be inclusive, then requiring inclusivity would capture rebel institutional behavior aimed at acting like a state, rather than capturing rebel recruitment tactics.

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<sup>26</sup>Please contact author if a source is missing.

**Table A.1: Overview of Existing Rebel Governance Datasets**

	Level of Analysis	Number of Institutions	Number of Rebel Groups	Time Coverage	Coding Procedures
Rebel Quasi-State Dataset	Rebel-Year	25	235	1945-2012	Human coders
Insurgent Social Services Provision Dataset (Stewart, 2016)	Insurgent-Year	2	304	1945-2003	Human coders
Rebel Governance Dataset (Huang, 2016)	War	12	127	1950-2006	Human coders
Rebelocracy (Arjona, 2016)	Colombian locality-Armed Group-Year	6	10	1970-2012	Interviews
TOIS (Wagstaff and Jung, 2017)	Group-year	2	403	1969-2013	Text analysis
Negotiating with Rebels (Heger and Jung, 2017)	Group-year	7	396	1980-2010	Lexis-Nexis text analysis

### A.3 Mediation, Armed Conflict Outcomes and Service Provision

The statistics cited in the introduction were calculated using the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset. The figures that follow breaks all 235 rebel groups into three categories. The first are the groups that never provided any services, which I call no service providers. The second category includes all rebel groups that provided at least one year of at least one service, but not all of the top five services. These services are the social institutions from the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset from Table ???. The third group comprises the rebel groups that provided at least one year of each of the top five most common services: education, health care, law, policing and justice. The second and third categories are mutually exclusive. Any rebel group that provided all five services was removed from the “at least one” service category and placed in the “top five services” category. Figure A.1 plots the number of years each rebel group had mediation with the government. The dashed line is the mean number of years for each category. No service rebel groups had an average of .95 years of attempted mediation. Providing at least one service increased this average to 1.8 years, and groups that provided all of the top five most common services had an average of 2.95 years with attempted mediation.

Figure A.2 graphs the percent of groups in each of the three provision categories that ended their most recent episode of violence by six military outcome types.<sup>27</sup> Considering the increased number of years with mediation attempts that the service-providing rebels have, the difference between no service and at least one service rebel groups ending with a peace agreement is small, about four percentage points. However, rebels that provide the top five services are less likely to end with a peace agreement than by low activity, a government military victory or a ceasefire. In fact, 50% of rebel groups that provided the top five services ended with low activity, despite the fact that these groups have, on average, three times more years with attempted mediation than their no service providing counterparts.

### A.4 Robustness Check

As a robustness check, I ran a model where the dependent variable is the signing of a peace agreement rather looking at whether the rebel group dissolved under a peace agreement or not. In this specification, years after a peace agreement was signed were dropped out of the analysis but the rebel group could re-enter the data if violence occurred two years after the peace agreement was signed. There are two reasons I used the specification I did in this paper. The first is that signing a peace agreement is not equivalent to resolving the conflict. I am interested in **successful** peace agreements, and removing the rebels from the data after they choose to dissolve is a better measure of this. Second, peace agreements often fall apart after the signing when it comes to implementing them. Therefore, using the signing of a peace agreement as the key event and dropping data after a peace agreement is signed will not provide accurate answers to the question of how rebel institutions affect negotiated peace.

However, the results from using the signing of a peace agreement should be consistent with the main results. I ran the models using the count variables and a cubic time polynomial to approximate event analysis. The event, signing a peace agreement, occurs the year rebels and the government signed a peace agreement. Table A.2 shows the results. I ran separate models for rebel education, health care, law, policing, justice, as well as for a count of the number of top five services provided and the number of services provided. None of these variables are statistically significant. They are, however, still negative. This is consistent with the

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<sup>27</sup>These are the six military outcomes as defined in the 2010 version of UCDP’s conflict termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010). I separated government military victories from rebel military victories and dropped ongoing conflicts, as of 2009.

Figure A.1: Number of years of attempted mediation, separated by provider categories





Figure A.2: Number of rebel groups with each outcome type, separated by their social service provision



results presented in this paper.

**Table A.2: Linear regression results for year negotiated settlement signed**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Education count	-0.093 (0.102)						
Health count		-0.018 (0.075)					
Law count			-0.523 (0.516)				
Police count				-0.163 (0.132)			
Justice count					-0.0004 (0.0003)		
Services (Top 5) count (yearly)						-0.414 (0.368)	
Service count (yearly)							-0.468 (0.292)
Observations	1,065	1,077	1,077	1,071	1,055	1,120	1,120
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

*Note: Cubic time polynomial included for yearly count variables. \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01*  
*Standard errors clustered by Rebel group. Controls included but not reported: Participatory*  
*democracy, primary education enrollment ratio, infant mortality, government military victory,*  
*rebel military victory, centralization, rebel size (ln), rebel strength, battle deaths (ln), mediation,*  
*territorial, GDP per capita (ln), control territory, communist, and number of foreign supporters.*  
*Yearly analysis considering years under a negotiated settlement until failure or group disband.*

## A.5 Other Institutions and Successful Negotiated Settlements

In this section, I explore the effects of other rebel institutions on successful negotiated settlements. I ran models for rebel border patrols, joining an International Organization (IO), diplomatic missions abroad, elections, constitutions, currency, and three forms of rebel government: parallel, government-in-exile and local. The regression results in Tables A.3 and A.4 complement those found in the main body of this paper. A rebel border patrol is the only institution that is statistically significant in these models. It is also negative, which is in line with the strategic stalling theory. In fact, the effect of going from no border patrol to ten years with a border patrol decreases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement by seven percent.

While the other institution coefficients are not statistically significant, all but joining an international organization and government-in-exile are negative. Some of them are, however, very small. The strategic stalling theory suggests that rebels anticipate increased support over time from civilians and therefore attempt to stall signing a peace agreement. Not all of the governance institutions coded in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset should follow this logic. Specifically, institutions through which rebels engage with foreign states, rather than civilians, should not incentivize stalling. Institutions like joining an international organization and governments-in-exile are not likely to engender civilian support over time. Therefore, the positive coefficients on joining an international organization and government-in-exile are not surprising. However, it should be noted that these coefficients are not statistically significant so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that joining and international organization or having a government-in-exile simply have no effect on the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.

**Table A.3: Linear regression results of political institutions on negotiated settlements**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rebel Border Patrol count	-0.007*** (0.003)					
Rebel Join IO count		0.001 (0.002)				
Rebel Diplomatic Mission count			-0.0004 (0.001)			
Rebel Elections count				-0.0001 (0.001)		
Rebel Constitution count					-0.001 (0.001)	
Rebel Currency count						-0.009 (0.006)
Battle deaths (ln)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
Mediation	0.066*** (0.025)	0.059*** (0.022)	0.062*** (0.023)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.059*** (0.022)	0.061*** (0.023)
Territorial	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)
Control territory	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)
Communist	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)
Number of Foreign Supporters	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	1,045	1,064	1,026	1,064	1,045	1,056

*Continued on next page*

Table A.3 – Continued from previous page

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

*Note: Cubic time polynomial included for yearly count variables. \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01*  
*Standard errors clustered by Rebel group. Controls included but not reported: Participatory*  
*democracy, primary education enrollment ratio, infant mortality, government military*  
*victory, rebel military victory, centralization, rebel size (ln) and rebel strength.*  
*Yearly analysis considering years under a negotiated settlement until failure or group disband.*

**Table A.4: Linear regression of rebel government types on negotiated settlements**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Negotiated Settlement		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Parallel Government count	-0.0003 (0.0004)		
Government-in-Exile count		0.00001 (0.001)	
Local Government count			-0.0004 (0.0005)
Battle deaths (ln)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
Mediation	0.060*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)
Territorial	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.020** (0.009)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)
Control territory	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)
Communist	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)
Number of Foreign Supporter	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	1,059	1,063	1,064
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓

*Note: Cubic time polynomial included for yearly count variables. Standard errors clustered by Rebel group. Controls included but not reported: Participatory democracy, primary education enrollment ratio, infant mortality, government military victory, rebel military victory, centralization, rebel size (ln). Yearly analysis considering years under a negotiated settlement until failure or group disband.*

## A.6 Terrorists, Rebels and Service Provision

Previous work has suggested a positive relationship between stable negotiations, part of which includes a negotiated settlement being reached, and service provision (Heger and Jung, 2017). The finding here, however, suggests either a negative or null relationship between service provision and negotiated settlements. There are two possible reasons for this. First, it could be because the measure of service provision and negotiated settlements are different. The Terrorist and Insurgent Organization Service Provision dataset (Heger and Jung, 2017) measures the likelihood that a given group provided a specific service, based on the number of times service vocabulary appears in the same news article as the group, compared to the number of times each word is used over all the groups. Heger and Jung also provide a rank order variable of the groups based on this word score. The Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset codes from a wide range of scholarly and journalist sources using human coders.<sup>28</sup>

Heger and Jung use negotiation data from Cronin's How Terrorism Ends data (2009). Negotiations occur when the terrorist group engages in discussions with an external agent, usually but not necessarily a government. Talks are considered stable when they either resolve or lead to a cessation of the conflict.<sup>29</sup> Unstable talks occur when the negotiations are abandoned or broken by either side, or the terrorist group experiences a major split due to negotiations. I use the UCDP conflict termination variable that codes for when a peace agreement is signed by two parties.

Second, the different results could be due to different case selection criteria. Lindsey Heger and Danielle Jung use the Terrorist and Insurgent Organization Service Provision, which includes over 400 organizations, and Cronin's data on terrorist negotiations (Heger and Jung, 2017; Cronin, 2009). The groups included must have caused civilian injuries or fatalities and have sustained organization. A terrorist's goals are political and their strategy specifically targets civilians (Cronin, 2009, 7). This diverges from the definition of armed conflict used to identify armed non-state actors, which I call rebels. Armed conflict is a contest over one of two broad goals: control of the government or control of territory. Deaths must exceed 25 and be battle-related (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Civilian targeting is not required like it is for terrorist groups, although civilians often die in the midst of an armed conflict. Conceptually, there is overlap between terrorist groups and rebel groups, but there is also important differentiation (Findley and Young, 2011).

I was able to match 75 rebel groups in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset to terrorist groups in Cronin's data.<sup>30</sup> Table A.5 presents cross tabs using Cronin's negotiation variable and the Rebel Quasi-State Institution service count variable. There is a very slight positive correlation between rebels who provided services and those who did not, and stable negotiations.<sup>31</sup> Table A.6 shows the ordinary least squares regression results of stable negotiations on rebel service provision. The correlation between rebel service provision and stable negotiations is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the sample of terrorist groups is fundamentally different from the sample of rebel groups.

I also examined the correlation between the TIOS normalized service variables (Education, Health, and Security) and the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions service variables. Since the TIOS data is built from a list of terrorist groups, and the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions data covers armed actors involved in civil wars,

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<sup>28</sup>See Appendix A.8 for a sample of the coding notes compiled for this dataset.

<sup>29</sup>Variable is called *talksstable*.

<sup>30</sup>Cronin does not use an ID number and in many cases does not provide the country, only the geographical region where the group is active. Therefore, I matched the groups by name as best as possible and any unclear matches were not coded.

<sup>31</sup>The correlation is .072

**Table A.5: Crosstabs of Cronin’s negotiations variable and rebel service provision**

Number of Services	Status of Negotiations		Total
	None or Failed	Stable	
0	44 (74.5%)	16 (25.5%)	59 (100%)
1+	11 (73.3%)	4 (26.7%)	15 (100%)
Total	55	19	74

*talksstable* variable in Cronin (2009) and Heger and Jung (2017).

Number of Services based on Rebel Quasi-State Institutions data.

Row percentages in parentheses.

there were only 72 groups that were in both datasets. Table A.7 reports the results of ordinary least squares regression of two different versions of the service institutions variables in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions data. The first is a binary variable indicating if the rebel group ever provided the service. The second is a percent variable that captures the percentage of years the group provided the service.

The results in Table A.7 show there is no statistically significant correlation between TIOS health and security variables, and the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions health, policing and justice variables. Normalized education (from TIOS) is statistically significant and positively correlated with the Rebel QSI education percent variable, but not the education provide variable. This suggests that the quality of news coverage of rebel services may vary by service. Therefore, the TIOS measures of health and security are likely picking up something different than the Rebel QSI health, policing and justice services.

**Table A.6: Regression of stable negotiations on service count**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Stable Negotiations
Rebel service count	0.015 (0.027)
Constant	0.253*** (0.056)
Observations	75

*Note: Unit of analysis is rebel group. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard errors clustered by rebel group.  
Correlation is .072*

**Table A.7: Regression results of Rebel QSI service provision on TIOS service variables (Heger and Jung, 2017)**

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Education provide	Education percent	Health provide	Health percent	Police provide	Police percent	Justice provide	Justice percent
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education Normalized		0.885 (0.819)	1.209** (0.536)						
Health Normalized				0.034 (0.626)	-0.168 (0.374)				
Security Normalized						0.356 (0.486)	0.164 (0.299)	-0.351 (0.488)	-0.180 (0.323)
Constant		0.395*** (0.083)	0.147*** (0.053)	0.387*** (0.073)	0.175*** (0.042)	0.365*** (0.078)	0.182*** (0.047)	0.454*** (0.078)	0.227*** (0.051)
Observations		72	71	72	71	72	71	72	71
R <sup>2</sup>		0.016	0.069	0.00004	0.003	0.008	0.004	0.007	0.004
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.002	0.055	-0.014	-0.012	-0.007	-0.010	-0.007	-0.010

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## A.7 Rebel Quasi-State Institutions Dataset

### A.7.1 Five most common rebel service institutions

**Education:** Rebel education provided to civilians. The curriculum must include basic skills like reading, writing, arithmetic. Education that is purely “political,” that is, exclusively teaches the rebel ideology while excluding basic skills, is not included. Professional schools, like teacher’s colleges, are included.

**Health care:** Rebel health care provided to civilians. Rebels can either routinely allow civilians to be treated in their soldier hospitals, or create clinics/hospitals exclusively for civilians. Traditional medical practices are also included.

**Policing:** Rebel policing between civilians, not external security from government military forces (or other competing groups).

**Law:** Rebel imposed rules on civilian behavior. These laws may be in line with cultural or village norms of behavior, or they may reflect rebel views of appropriate civilian behavior. However, civilians must be made aware of the rules.

**Justice:** Rebel justice systems including courts, prisons and enforcement of penalties (e.g. collecting fines).

## A.8 Sample Coding for the Republic of Chechnya

### Overview of Conflict

First president: Dudayev. Killed April 21, 1996 (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 45)

Maskhadov next president. Elected January 1997. Killed March 8, 2005 (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 221 and 228)

Abdul Khalim Saidullayev was Maskhadovs successor, but not elected. (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 229) Killed July 2006.

Doku Umarov was Saidullayevs successor. Replaced national objectives with global jihad ((Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 233)

“Our defeat was not on the day that Putin declared military victory, nor on the day that Ramzan Kadyrov was ‘elected’ President, nor on the day Maskhadov was killed; although his death certainly hastened it. The end of our struggle came in October 2007 when Doku Umarovs proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate dissolved the Chechen republic Ichkeria, and ended the Chechen national resistance by submerging it into an abstract transnational jihad. The time period from Shamil Basayevs raid on Nazran in June 2004, to Doku Umarovs proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate in November 2007, saw the deterioration and eventual abrogation of the nationalist cause.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 221)

**Existence:** 1990-2012

**Flag:** Coded 1990-2012

Wikipedia “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”

1990: “Article 18 states that: ‘The Chechen-Ingush Republic has the attributes of a sovereign state: citizenship, a crest, a flag, a national anthem and a capital.’” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 82)

**Organized like a Government** Not Coded

**Elections:** Coded 1991-1997

1991: “Then, on October 27, 1991, Dudayev was elected president of Chechnya.” (Williams 2015, 82)

1997: “The OSCE was strictly observing the election as though it were one in a region of Russia, although there was not a Russian election official in sight and all the candidates were supporters of Chechen independence.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 363)

“The Chechen authorities organized the elections in haste partly to consolidate their victory quickly and partly to fill the power vacuum left by the end of the war. As much as a President the country needed a Parliament to give some kind of representation to the different regions. It was the fifth since 1990. None of the others had lasted their full term.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 365)

1997: “The OSCE provided funding and technical support so that the process would go smoothly; they facilitated voter registration, printing ballots, campaigning, and the counting was completed in a short amount of time by people who had little experience conducting elections.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 74)

This was the last election held.

**Parallel Government:** Coded 1990-2012

1990: “Article 18 states that: ‘The Chechen-Ingush Republic has the attributes of a sovereign state: citizenship, a crest, a flag, a national anthem and a capital.’” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 82)

“In November 1990, the Chechen National Congress assembled and ‘in the name of the Chechen people declared the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho.’ The Chechen-Ingush Republic was declared by the congress to be a sovereign state which intended to sign the union and federal treaties of the USSR on equal terms with the union republics...” (Dunlop 1998, 91)

1991: “Then, on October 27, 1991, Dudayev was elected president of Chechnya.” (Williams 2015, 82)

1991: “Reacting to the threatening noises emanating from Moscow, General Dudaev, on 1 November 1991, issued a decree declaring the Chechen Republic to be a fully independent state. The following day, the just-elected Chechen parliament passed a resolution ratifying Dudaevs decree.” (Dunlop 1998, 115)

1991: “In October 1991, Dudaev had named Mamodaev chairman of the Provisional Committee for the Administration of the Peoples Economy in the first government to be formed in ‘independent Chechnya’; in May 1992, Mamodaev was named first deputy prime minister of the Chechen Republic (i.e., de facto head of the republics government).” (Dunlop 1998, 150)

1994-1996: “The new authorities were the field commanders, who claimed that during the war they had executed the basic functions of a local government in their jurisdictions.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 79-80)

1995: “...yet the commanders, many of whom had been very close to their President, all swore allegiance to Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the Vice-President, who now took over as leader.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 323)

1995: Minister of Education: Khozh Akhmed Yarikhanov appointed by Dudayev (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 57)

1997: “The Chechen authorities organized the elections in haste partly to consolidate their victory quickly and partly to fill the power vacuum left by the end of the war. As much as a President the country needed a Parliament to give some kind of representation to the different regions. It was the fifth since 1990. None of the others had lasted their full term.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 365)

1999: “The next day I spoke to Iskhanov and accepted the position [as Foreign Minister for the Republic of Chechnya Ichkeria].” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 146)

2002: “In 2002, Maskhadov selected Sadulayev, who was loyal to Maskhadov in his struggles against the Wahhabis, as his vice president. With the death of President Maskhadov in 2005, President Sadulayev began a policy of creating a Caucasian Front to spread the resistance to Russia to neighboring Muslim republics in the region. This Caucasian Front united jihadi-fighting jamaats in the lands of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Circassia, Ossetia, and Adyghe.” (Williams 2015, 197)

2003: “...but here we were offering to disband our government and our army.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 215)

2006: “A year later, in February 2006, Sadulaev decreed additional moves toward Islamic norms. He reshuffled the Chechen government and removed the moderate ministers...” (Hughes 2007, 106)

2007: “He [Umarov] would officially do this on October 31, 2007, when he declared the abolishment of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the creation of the Caucasus Emirate, with himself as emir (military leader). The creation of a loosely organized, pan-Caucasian Islamic state, or emirate, at the expense of the goal of creating a narrower, secular Chechen republic clashed with the goals of exiled Chechen Foreign Minister Akhmed Zakayev, who was a secularist living in London, and Chechen nationalists. In essence, it meant that the earlier generation of Chechen nationalists had been replaced by Salafi-Wahhabi Islamists who wanted to establish a pan-Caucasian shariah law state.” (Williams 2015, 198)

2007 on: “The Chechen resistance now has two competing governments: the one in the mountains led by Doku Umarov, which considers itself the headquarters of the emirate, and a government-in-exile with Akhmed Zakayev as Prime Minister, which considers itself the continuation of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 243)

2007-2010: “The new emirate was quickly condemned by the Western democratic-leaning vestiges of the Dudayev and Maskhadov eras, most notably the minister of foreign affairs, Akhmed Zakayev, who lives in exile in London and still manages the affairs of the remaining ChRI government in exile.” (Schaefer 2010, 237)

2007-2010: “Left without any military presence in the region or mechanisms to assert his government's position, Akhmed Zakayev is a leader in name only, yet Zakayev continues his activities and issues official decrees from the government-in-exile to the European Union and the United Nations on a regular basis.” (Schaefer 2010, 237)

2010: September 17th Akhmed Zakayev arrested in Poland. “Last year Chechnya's Kremlin-installed president, Ramzan Kadyrov, tried to persuade Zakayev to return home, offering him a job as theatre director in the capital, Grozny. Zakayev, a former actor and the head of Chechnya's government-in-exile, held a series of discussions in Europe with Kadyrov's trusted aide Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov about political reconciliation. The plan fell through after Russia refused to drop outstanding terrorist charges against him. At the same time, Chechnya's current Islamist rebel leadership denounced Zakayev as a traitor and announced their intention to kill him.” (Harding 2010)

**Government-in-exile:** Coded 2007-2012

2007: “He [Umarov] would officially do this on October 31, 2007, when he declared the abolishment of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the creation of the Caucasus Emirate, with himself as emir (military leader). The creation of a loosely organized, pan-Caucasian Islamic state, or emirate, at the expense of the goal of creating a narrower, secular Chechen republic clashed with the goals of exiled Chechen Foreign Minister Akhmed Zakayev, who was a secularist living in London, and Chechen nationalists. In essence, it meant that the earlier generation of Chechen nationalists had been replaced by Salafi-Wahhabi Islamists who wanted to establish a pan-Caucasian shariah law state.” (Williams 2015, 198)

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**Local/Village government:** Not coded

**National government:** Coded 1990-2007

1990: “Article 18 states that: ‘The Chechen-Ingush Republic has the attributes of a sovereign state: citizenship, a crest, a flag, a national anthem and a capital.’” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 82)

“In November 1990, the Chechen National Congress assembled and ‘in the name of the Chechen people declared the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho.’ The Chechen-Ingush Republic was declared by the congress to be a sovereign state which intended to sign the union and federal treaties of the USSR on equal terms with the union republics...” (Dunlop 1998, 91)

1991: “Then, on October 27, 1991, Dudayev was elected president of Chechnya.” (Williams 2015, 82)

1991: “Reacting to the threatening noises emanating from Moscow, General Dudaev, on 1 November 1991, issued a decree declaring the Chechen Republic to be a fully independent state. The following day, the just-elected Chechen parliament passed a resolution ratifying Dudaev’s decree.” (Dunlop 1998, 115)

1991: 11 In October 1991, Dudaev had named Mamodaev chairman of the Provisional Committee for the Administration of the Peoples Economy in the first government to be formed in ‘independent Chechnya’; in

May 1992, Mamodaev was named first deputy prime minister of the Chechen Republic (i.e., de facto head of the republics government)." (Dunlop 1998, 150)

1994-1996: "The new authorities were the field commanders, who claimed that during the war they had executed the basic functions of a local government in their jurisdictions." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 79-80)

1995: "...yet the commanders, many of whom had been very close to their President, all swore allegiance to Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the Vice-President, who now took over as leader." (Gall and de Waal 1998, 323)

1995: Minister of Education: Khozh Akhmed Yarikhanov appointed by Dudayev (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 57)

1997: "The Chechen authorities organized the elections in haste partly to consolidate their victory quickly and partly to fill the power vacuum left by the end of the war. As much as a President the country needed a Parliament to give some kind of representation to the different regions. It was the fifth since 1990. None of the others had lasted their full term." (Gall and de Waal 1998, 365)

1999: "The next day I spoke to Iskhanov and accepted the position [as Foreign Minister for the Republic of Chechnya Ichkeria]." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 146)

2002: "In 2002, Maskhadov selected Sadulayev, who was loyal to Maskhadov in his struggles against the Wahhabis, as his vice president. With the death of President Maskhadov in 2005, President Sadulayev began a policy of creating a Caucasian Front to spread the resistance to Russia to neighboring Muslim republics in the region. This Caucasian Front united jihadi-fighting jamaats in the lands of Dagesan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Circassia, Ossetia, and Adyghe." (Williams 2015, 197)

2003: "...but here we were offering to disband our government and our army." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 215)

2006: "A year later, in February 2006, Sadulaev decreed additional moves toward Islamic norms. He reshuffled the Chechen government and removed the moderate ministers..." (Hughes 2007, 106)

2007: "He [Umarov] would officially do this on October 31, 2007, when he declared the abolishment of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the creation of the Caucasus Emirate, with himself as emir (military leader). The creation of a loosely organized, pan-Caucasian Islamic state, or emirate, at the expense of the goal of creating a narrower, secular Chechen republic clashed with the goals of exiled Chechen Foreign Minister Akhmed Zakayev, who was a secularist living in London, and Chechen nationalists...In essence, it meant that the earlier generation of Chechen nationalists had been replaced by Salafi-Wahhabi Islamists who wanted to establish a pan-Caucasian shariah law state." (Williams 2015, 198)

**Paper National government:** Not coded

**Other:** Not coded

**Border Patrol:** Coded 1996

1996: "...Maskhadov became the Acting Prime Minister and coordinated the joint activities of the Chechen and Russian armed forces in Chechnya. Shamil took on a nominal position as director of border guards and customs; what had been his central command became the bureaucracy of customs officers and border guards. He was responsible for setting up the customs posts on the Chechen borders but he rarely left Vedenno. Instead, his subordinates would visit the new posts and report back to him." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 68)

**Identification Documents:** Not Coded

“...Chechens kept the Russian ruble and their Soviet passports.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 106)

**Political Party:** Not Coded

**Attempt to Join IO:** Not Coded

**Join IO:** Coded 1991-2010

Unrecognized Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) member

Joined August 6, 1991

Membership suspended September 25, 2010

**Diplomatic Mission Abroad:** Coded 1992-2006, Missing 2007

Not coded for 2007-2012 because the government-in-exile did not have foreign representation.

“In 1992, as well as visiting Turkey, he travelled to Sudan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The pilot Hussein Khamidov flew him...’In all the countries we flew to Dudayev was received very well and on the highest level, with red carpets,’ Khamidov recalled. Dudayev subsequently squandered a lot of this goodwill. Mairbek Vachargayev, his Foreign Ministry representative in Moscow in early 1992, despaired of his President’s impetuous stabs at diplomacy...What I told him in secret he retold on television. The next day I was forced to explain to the ambassadors why President Dudayev was peaking on television about what was confidential.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 109)

1992/1993: “When I was briefly on the Foreign Ministry staff in 1992-93, I saw correspondence between Dudayev and President Vladislav Ardzinba of Abkhazia in which Dudayev refused to permit the Abkhaz to set up representation in Grozny.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 6-7)

1993: “In September 1993 Dudayev appointed Charles Tchokotoua, a cultivated American Georgian with a Chelsea address, as his ‘Ambassador to the European Community’. Tchokotoua helped organize a trip to France in June 1993.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 110)

1992: “He [Dudaev] met with British parliamentarians in Westminster, and in Houston, Texas, he signed a two-year contract worth about \$100 million with San Antonio-based EnForce Energy Corp., covering work, drilling and other services in two oil fields north of the Chechen capital of Grozny.” (Hughes 2007, 80)

1999: “Representatives of foreign governments met with us, usually in a personal capacity, and we were permitted to attend international forums, but usually without the right to speak or vote.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 194)

2000: “With their help I was able to have many meetings in Washington, including with Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State...” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 195)

2000: “My first trip to the United States was in January 2000, where I [Foreign Minister Akhmadov] had meetings in the Senate and the House of Representatives.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 184)

2000: Taliban recognizes Chechen independence. “On January 16, Taliban leader Mullah Omar met with former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev in Afghanistan and officially announced that the Taliban recognizes Chechnya’s independence.” (The Taliban Formally Recognizes Chechnya 2000)

2002: “In the summer of 2002, when I was already in Washington I had two meetings about this with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was the Co-Chairman of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya and the former National Security Advisor.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 182)

2006: "...in February 2006, the head of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society was given a two-year suspended sentence for inciting ethnic hatred by publishing on the internet appeals for peace by Maskhadov and the London-based separatist envoy Akhmed Zakaev..." (Wood 2007, 112)

**Media:** Coded 1991-2012

1991: "That evening [on August 22, 1991], demonstrators surrounded the republican television center and, after a short clash with the militia, seized the building. Dudaev then spoke on television and explained the political goals of the national radicals." (Dunlop 1998, 102)

1991: "By the beginning of September, the ispolkom under Dudaev increasingly controlled the situation on the ground in Grozny. A national guard, largely armed with rifles and pistols, had been formed by the radicals, and, by the end of August, they had succeeded in seizing the main television and radio stations in the city." (Dunlop 1998, 104)

1992: "In 1992, as well as visiting Turkey, he travelled to Sudan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The pilot Hussein Khamidov flew him...'In all the countries we flew to Dudayev was received very well and on the highest level, with red carpets,' Khamidov recalled. Dudayev subsequently squandered a lot of this goodwill. Mairbek Vachargayev, his Foreign Ministry representative in Moscow in early 1992, despaired of his Presidents impetuous stabs at diplomacy...What I told him in secret he retold on television. The next day I was forced to explain to the ambassadors why President Dudayev was peaking on television about what was confidential.'" (Gall and de Waal 1998, 109)

1994: "Dudayev began his working day in the late afternoon recording long television addresses..." (Gall and de Waal 1998, 104)

1995: "Movladi Udugov was the Minister for Communications and Press and he was usually the one giving interviews to the media but he was traveling with Dudayev." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 26)

1999: "Our television station would allow anyone who wanted to speak to appear..." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 124)

1999: "On July 4th, I [Foreign Minister Akhmadov] had written one of my first press releases..." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 151)

"Chechenpress functioned as a state information agency under the ministry of information..." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 155)

Chechenpress: 1999 (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 155); 2002 (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 204); 2007 (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 243)

1999-2012: "Chechenpress.com and Kavkazcenter.com were among the first websites created by Chechens who lived in Chechnya at that time and were members of separatist groups. Both were founded in 1999 but from the beginning have followed very different paths. Chechenpress.com, created by the late Makkal Sabdullayev, a separatist close to the then President Aslan Maskhadov, defined itself as 'the press agency of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria' and its main objective was to give a voice to the separatist government. When the second Chechen war started, it became one of the main online separatist channels, diffusing information about the war and the separatist government. Published in both Russian and English, it closed in 2012, after coming under repeated attack, allegedly from the Russian security services." (Campana and Duco 2015, 683)

2005-2017:

Government website:

Domain Name: WAYNAKH.COM  
Registry Domain ID: 139289631\_DOMAIN\_COM-VRSN  
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com  
Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com  
Updated Date: 2017-12-18T10:37:53Z  
Creation Date: 2005-01-10T15:02:31Z

**Political Other:** Not Coded

**Currency:** Coded 1994-1997, Missing 1991-1993 and 1998-2007

Early 1990s: "...led Dudaev to push for a separate Chechen currency against the advice of Abubakarov, who pointed out that Chechnya lacked the reserves to back it. But, propelled by the notion that a sovereign state should have its own currency, Dudaev had nakhar notes in several denominations printed, and they were only prevented from coming into circulation by the outbreak of war." (Wood 2007, 62-3)

1994: "The original nakhars, printed up to 1994, all bore Dudayev's portrait in blazing colors. But an incident involving the murder of a Dudayev relative near the British printing press and cold feet over issuing money portraying Moscow's foe put an end to plans to issue that currency." (Browning 2007)

1997: "Now, with stacks of nakhars printed at a secret press in Britain sitting in its vaults, the bank is preparing to launch the nakhar in a bid to make Chechnya an independent state in which the Russian ruble is a foreign currency." (Browning 1997)

Chechens kept the Russian ruble and their Soviet passports. (Gall and de Waal 1998, 106)

For pictures (or to purchase) Chechen Naxars (for collectors) see: [https://colnect.com/en/banknotes/list/country/4146-Russia/series/73261-Chechnya\\_ND\\_1995\\_Separatist\\_Notes](https://colnect.com/en/banknotes/list/country/4146-Russia/series/73261-Chechnya_ND_1995_Separatist_Notes)

**Illegal Network Connections:** Coded 1991-1996, Missing 1997-2007

*Note: This variable is not considered a rebel quasi-state institution. It was included to use as a potential control variable.*

"This headlong economic collapse forced Dudaev and his circle increasingly to turn to questionable sources of support. Chechnya was transformed into the largest center of counterfeit money and of false financial documents on the territory of the former USSR. The republic also became a major transit point for various contraband, including weapons and narcotics." (Dunlop 1998, 127)

1991-1994: "...the Russian military's 'narco-mafia' and Dudaev had worked out an agreement for the unobstructed passage through Chechnya of drugs brought in from Afghanistan and Tajikistan." (Dunlop 1998, 131)

"...Yandarbiev, who served as acting vice president under Dudaev, has admitted that a number of high-ranking Chechen officials were corrupt and sought to profit from their positions." (Dunlop 1998, 128)

1993-1994: "...representatives of Grozny city council, as well as Dudayev's own family, were involved in the smuggling operation." (Seely 2001, 184)

1992-1996: "In a series of outspoken attacks, Lev Rokhlin, one of the Russian military commanders in the war, accused Russian politicians of trading arms and oil with Dudayev. In 1996 he began naming names." (Seely 2001, 197)

**Negotiate Resources Rights:** Coded 1992-1994, Missing 1995-1996

“...Moscow kept on sending oil to the refineries in 1992 and 1993. The official reason for this was that the deliveries could only be reduced gradually because the rest of the North Caucasus was supplied with fuel from Grozny and could not be cut off; so exports to Stavropol ceased only in August 1993 and to Dagestan in November 1994, one month before the war began. This decision meant that ample oil revenues kept coming in to independent Chechnya, making a mockery of the officially proclaimed Russian blockade...Officially 23 million tonnes of oil were exported from Chechnya between 1991 and 1994, mainly through the Black Sea ports.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 127)

“While Dudaev had ‘nationalized’ the republic’s oil companies and refineries, this did not, it turned out, in practice adversely affect relations between Chechnya and many Russian companies and oil officials. The Dudaev government had little difficulty in exporting oil despite the regimes poor relations with official Moscow. Sergei Stepashin, at the time the head of the Russian FSK, confirmed that corruption originating from Dudaevs regime reached ministerial level in Moscow and the manipulation of oil export quotas was one mechanism used for profiteering.” (Dunlop 1998, 130)

1992-1994: “He [Dudaev] met with British parliamentarians in Westminster, and in Houston, Texas, he signed a two-year contract worth about \$100 million with San Antonio-based EnForce Energy Corp., covering work, drilling and other services in two oil fields north of the Chechen capital of Grozny.” (Hughes 2007, 80)

1997: There is no oil flowing into the Grozny refineries, and only small earnings from the meagre 1.4 million tonnes that Chechnya extracts itself. (Gall and de Waal 1998, 368)

#### **Economic Treaty:** Not Coded

Not coded: “...since Chechnya controlled only a section of the latter and had a vital interest in keeping it open, the issues discussed were transit rights and the costs of repairing the pipeline. In July 1997 Russia agreed to meet the latter, and in September promised to pay \$845,000 for the right to pump 200,000 tons of oil through Chechnya; but the Kremlin then continued to haggle over the method of payment, and by June 1998 had still not paid a kopeck.” (Wood 2007, 84)

1997: “In May 1997, when the oil deal seemed close, Raduev was interviewed by a Russian newspaper and made a prescient threat: Now they think theyve won the oil contract. Theyre mistaken. Theyve lost.” (Evangelista 2002, 52)

#### **Tax:** Coded 1996-2000

Not coded for 1991-1995: Dudayev failed to “...keep the economy running, to fill the republican budget by raising tax revenue...” (Sokirianskaya 2014, 95)

1991-1994: “Oil was just one item among many being traded in this fantastic customs-free zone.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 129)

1991-1994: “Dudaev lifted all taxes on profits and eased restrictions on the small trade many engaged in to make ends meet.” (Wood 2007, 63)

1992: “Beginning in 1992, Chechnya ceased altogether to pay taxes into the Russian federal budget, and it was incapable of generating lawful sources of revenue. The key industries in the republic were the oil-extraction and, especially, the oil-processing industry. By the beginning of December 1994, no more than 100 of Chechnyas 1,500 oil wells were still producing.” (Dunlop 1998, 126)

1996: “...Maskhadov became the Acting Prime Minister and coordinated the joint activities of the Chechen and Russian armed forces in Chechnya. Shamil took on a nominal position as director of border guards and customs; what had been his central command became the bureaucracy of customs officers and border

guards. He was responsible for setting up the customs posts on the Chechen borders but he rarely left Vedeno. Instead, his subordinates would visit the new posts and report back to him.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 68)

1997-1999: “The second profit-generating line of the Chechen budget consisted in taxes from legal entities by 1998 [the Chechen government] stopped collecting taxes from individuals.” (Sokirianskaya 2014, 97)

1997-1999: “Overall economic decay put the few still functioning enterprises on the verge of bankruptcy: industry and businesses were simply unable to pay taxes...A large number of tax exemptions generously adopted by the Chechen parliament, often applied not only to those eligible, also significantly decreased the states capacity to collect budget revenues. The tax inspectorate checked only those companies that were registered...” (Sokirianskaya 2014, 97)

2000: Jul 25, 2000 A Russian federal force representative identified some sources of financial support for Chechen rebels. The sources included individuals, states and organizations. Among them was notorious Osama Bin Ladin known for having assigned 34m dollars for purchase of armament and communication equipment. Money also came from “taxes”, “collected” from Chechen businessmen, as well as from “contributions” made by ethnic Chechen criminal groups. States and organizations known for their financial commitment to the Chechen rebellion included Saudi Arabia; the international Islamic organization, Al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn (Two Holy Places); the Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group) radical organization; as well as the Turkish Refah radical Islamic organization, and the People’s Movement nationalist party (bbc).” (MAR “Chronology for Chechens in Russia”)

Not coded for 2001-2007 because after the Second Chechen war (1999-2000) the situation in Chechnya was different than in the inter-war years.

**Economic Other:** Not Coded

1997: “Maskhadov told us to deposit the money in the central bank...” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 88)

1991-1994: “Grozny became a commercial hub, its market drawing people from across the Caucasus and giving rise to a wealth of shuttle traders, who would take one of two flights leaving Grozny daily for Dubai, Turkey or even China, and return with electronic goods on which they would pay no duties as compared to the 20-30 percent due in Russia.” (Wood 2007, 63)

**Education:** Coded 1997-1999, Missing 2001-2007, Not Coded 1991-1996; 2000; 2008-2012

1991-1995: Public health and education collapsed. Many schools closed (Tishkov 2004, 66)

1995-1996: from 1995 to 1996, two successive governments in Grozny under Salambek Khadzhiyev and Doku Zavgayev worked with the federal authorities to provide basic necessities and carry out large-scale restoration of public services. When I visited Grozny in October 1995, all of its schools and hospitals were functioning, and this was also true of regions less affected by the war than the capital. Yet international humanitarian organizations refused to cooperate with the governments of Khadzhiyev and Zavgayev, labeling them pro-Moscow puppet regimes. (Tishkov 2004, 183) Not coded because the public education and health was not provided by the Republic of Chechnya government, but the Russian backed government in Chechnya.

1994: But ordinary civic life had collapsed, the government was spending no money on public services and people working in schools or hospitals had not been paid for months. If they went to work, they sat at their desks in their overcoats because there was no heating. (Gall and de Waal 1998, 103)

what Dudayev had done or failed to do. He has done nothing for the republic, he said. He hasn't built a single school or hospital. Dudayev had not even built a single mosque (Gall and de Waal 1998, 104)

Prior to 1994: Dudayev's failure to keep the economy running, to fill the republican budget by raising tax revenue, to provide for education and healthcare, to combat criminality, to ensure a functioning judicial system and to pay welfare, were quite evident before the war. (Sokirianskaya 2014, 95)

1997-1999: In schools, whereas in January 1998 a number of secular subjects were temporarily excluded from the school curriculum for the sake of economy (musical education, drawing, sketching, physical training), new mandatory subjects were introduced by the Ministry of Education: Arabic, introduction to Islam, Chechen ethics, introduction to Sharia and civil law. Islamic subjects were taught beginning in elementary school, where tuition was to be carried out in the Chechen language. The government developed an Islamic dress code for school children. While the secular educational system was in deep crisis, the authorities supported the creation of religious educational institutions. (Sokirianskaya 2014, 106)

#### **Health care:** Not Coded

1991-1995: "Public health and education collapsed. Many schools closed..." (Tishkov 2004, 66)

1995-1996: "...from 1995 to 1996, two successive governments in Grozny under Salambek Khadzhiyev and Doku Zavgayev worked with the federal authorities to provide basic necessities and carry out large-scale restoration of public services. When I visited Grozny in October 1995, all of its schools and hospitals were functioning, and this was also true of regions less affected by the war than the capital. Yet international humanitarian organizations refused to cooperate with the governments of Khadzhiyev and Zavgayev, labeling them pro-Moscow puppet regimes." (Tishkov 2004, 183) Not coded because the public education and health was not provided by the Republic of Chechnya government, but the Russian backed government in Chechnya.

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#### **Infrastructure:** Not Coded

**Transportation:** Coded 1997-1999; Missing 1991-1996 and 2000; Not Coded 2001-2012

1997: "In 1997, there were plans to restore the airport. The airport had been occupied early in the war by the Russians and did not require much repair." (Akhmadov and Lansky 2010, 90)

1999: "Then came the controversy over buses. The Ministry of Transportation received a proposal to divide buses with partitions, and women were to use the front entrance and men the back. However, someone noticed that most of our buses had only one door..." (Akhmadov and Lansky 2010, 124)

#### **Law:** Coded 1994-2007

1993: "In place of the Constitutional Court, which was disbanded in May-June 1993, Dudaev, in January 1994, established a 'constitutional collegium' of the Supreme Court, whose seven judges were to be named by himself." (Dunlop 1998, 151)

1994: "...in mid-November 1994 Dudaev finally proposed that his self-declared independent republic of Chechnya become an Islamic state, introducing sharia law and forming an Islamic battalion to 'counter Russian aggression.'" (Dunlop 1998, 149) 1996: In 1996, Acting President Yandarbiev took this a step further by introducing a new penal code for Chechnya, modelled on that of Sudan, and disbanding the secular courts. (Wood 2007, 90)

1997: "A lustration law was debated on television and in parliament..." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 80)

1997: No functioning criminal code, although other laws existed. "At best, in all of our agencies there were only a handful of professional investigators with experience in these matters. Moreover, we didn't have any laws. Was there a criminal code or procedural code to underlie the criminal code? None of this was in place in any meaningful way." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 103)

1998: "President Maskhadov reacted to these events by officially disbanding Barayev's notorious Special Purpose Islamic Regiment and disbanding its sharia courts of law... And despite the introduction of shari'ah courts, secular courts continued to operate." (Williams 2015, 129)

1998: Story of an arrest by the courts in 1998 for buying alcohol. See Akhmadov and Lanskoj (2010) page 130-131.

1999: "...[Maskhadov] declared full sharia law in February 1999." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 143)

2003: "The constitution was not functional in 2003. It had been rewritten many times, the last series of amendments carried out to make it conform to sharia law." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 214)

**Constitution:** Coded 1992-2012

"At this time [in February 1992], Dudayev and his followers wrote up a constitution for the new state. It is important once again to note that it had little to do with sharia Islamic law." (Williams 2015, 84)

1993: "In early 1993, Dudaev prepared amendments to the constitution of the Chechen Republic..." (Dunlop 1998, 150)

2003: "The constitution was not functional in 2003. It had been rewritten many times, the last series of amendments carried out to make it conform to sharia law." (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 214) Coded through 2012 because the Republic of Chechnya (not the Caucasus Emirate) still exists as a government in exile.

1992 Version available in Sources folder or at <http://www.waynakh.com/eng/chechnya/constitution/>

**Policing:** Coded 1997-1999, Missing 2000, Not coded 1991-1996; 2001-2012 (after Second Chechen War)

1991-1994: "Dudayev may have been president, but he had never been given the necessary mechanism with which to administer a state, namely, a monopoly on violence. He didn't have a police department to speak of, and if he had, he didn't have a way to pay them." (Schaefer 2010, 123)

1995: "[The Russian military] began by going back into all the villages that the Chechens had infiltrated back into during the cease-fire, and established some government control by bringing in pro-Kremlin Chechens who established a local administration within a zone of peace and accord. The army provided security, the bombings stopped, and the new administrations began providing basic services, rebuilding homes, and paying wages and pensions." (Schaefer 2010, 134)

Prior to 1994: “Dudayevs failure to keep the economy running, to fill the republican budget by raising tax revenue, to provide for education and healthcare, to combat criminality, to ensure a functioning judicial system and to pay welfare, were quite evident before the war.” (Sokirianskaya 2014, 95)

“Gantemirov, who was still only twenty-eight, was made Mayor of Grozny and simultaneously head of the city police with control over city property and, according to one source, a personal oil quota of 100,000 tonnes.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 108)

1997: “When he formed the first government, Maskhadov put all the defense and security ministries in the hands of his top commanders, who were also members of his electoral team. Magomed Khanbiyev became defense minister, Kazbek Makhashev became Chief of the Police Ministry (MVD), Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev became head of the Security Ministry. Soon there were as many security departments and guard services as there were mid-level commanders.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 81)

1997: “This lack of protection made law enforcement timid and uncertain. Investigators lacked everything, legal experience, training, and most importantly, motivation.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 104)

1997-1999: “The Chechen government deployed regular armed forces, the special battalion of the Department for the Security of the State and police units to confront illegal oil dealers.” (Sokirianskaya 2014, 99)

1998: “For example, in August 1998 the special battalion of the State Security Department, supported by police units...” (Sokirianskaya 2014, 100)

**Justice:** Coded 1995-1998; Missing 1999-2000, Not coded 2001-2012

Prior to 1994: “Dudayevs failure to keep the economy running, to fill the republican budget by raising tax revenue, to provide for education and healthcare, to combat criminality, to ensure a functioning judicial system and to pay welfare, were quite evident before the war.” (Sokirianskaya 2014, 95)

1995: “It was during the war that the first shari’a courts were set up, in April 1995, functioning parallel to the secular ones.” (Wood 2007, 90)

1996: “President Dudayev had been killed during the first war, and when Vice President Yandarbiyev assumed power, he decreed Soviet and Russian laws invalid, abolished secular courts, and created a shari’a court.” (Schaefer 2010, 172)

1996: “The sharia court had existed since the war and two units had been created in 1996 and assigned to the court...One of their duties was to guard the prisons.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 130)

1997: “Everything in Chechnya, including a trial in a shariah court...” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 80)

1997: “In formal terms Maskhadov had everything: a government, a parliament, a constitution, and a judicial system.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 99)

1998: Story of an arrest by the courts in 1998. See Akhmadov and Lanskoj (2010) page 130-131.

**Housing Assistance:** Not Coded

1995: “[The Russian military] began by going back into all the villages that the Chechens had infiltrated back into during the cease-fire, and established some government control by bringing in pro-Kremlin Chechens who established a local administration within a zone of peace and accord. The army provided security, the bombings stopped, and the new administrations began providing basic services, rebuilding homes, and paying wages and pensions.” (Schaefer 2010, 134)

**Constituency Politics:** Not Coded

**Welfare and Aid:** Not Coded

1991-1994: “Dudayevs government did not have money to pay pensions and salaries.” (Schaefer 2010, 123)

1994: “What was Avturkhanov’s main strategy then? Money, came the answer. He had just come from Moscow with two billion rubles of Russian budget money owed to the local population in pensions and salaries that had not been paid for three years ‘It makes no difference if we have Avturkhanov or Dudayev as long as were getting money.’” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 140) Avturkhanov was Dudayevs opposition who was on friendlier terms with Moscow. This shows that there was no aid going to the people under Dudayevs government.

1993: “When, in August 1993, he was asked why he was not paying pensions to Cossack and Russian retirees living in Chechnya, Dudaev responded angrily: ‘Why dont the Cossacks and Russians who live here ask the Russian authorities, Where are our pensions?’ Instead they demand them of Dudaev. And Dudaev himself does not receive the pension which he earned for serving thirty years in the armed forces.’ For the Chechen president, Russians living in his republic were simply not his responsibility...” (Dunlop 1998, 136)

1995: “[The Russian military] began by going back into all the villages that the Chechens had infiltrated back into during the cease-fire, and established some government control by bringing in pro-Kremlin Chechens who established a local administration within a zone of ‘peace and accord.’ The army provided security, the bombings stopped, and the new administrations began providing basic services, rebuilding homes, and paying wages and pensions.” (Schaefer 2010, 134)

**Social Other:** Not Coded

**Armed Forces:** Coded 1991-2003, Missing 2004-2007

1991: “By the beginning of September, the ispolkom under Dudaev increasingly controlled the situation on the ground in Grozny. A national guard, largely armed with rifles and pistols, had been formed by the radicals, and, by the end of August, they had succeeded in seizing the main television and radio stations in the city.” (Dunlop 1998, 104)

1992: “The Chechens responded by sending their own tank regiment...” (Schaefer 2010, 120)

“Ochirov reported in the spring of 1992 that ‘Provocations against military garrisons and the personal staff of parts of Grozny garrison began in October 1991 and have not stopped. At the current time 80 per cent of the heavy equipment and 75 percent of the small arms have been stolen.’...According to official lists, 226 aeroplanes, forty-two tanks, thirty-six armoured personnel carriers and 29,000 machine-guns were left behind in Chechnya.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 113)

1996: “...Maskhadov became the Acting Prime Minister and coordinated the joint activities of the Chechen and Russian armed forces in Chechnya. Shamil took on a nominal position as director of border guards and customs; what had been his central command became the bureaucracy of customs officers and border guards. He was responsible for setting up the customs posts on the Chechen borders but he rarely left Veden. Instead, his subordinates would visit the new posts and report back to him.” (Akhmadov and Lansky 2010, 68)

1997: “Chechnya is now de facto independent of Russia. It has its own army, own government and is prepared to defend its borders.” (Gall and de Waal 1998, 368)

2003: “but here we were offering to disband our government and our army.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 215)

**Military Other:** Coded 1994, Missing 1995-2007

This variable included years when the rebel group has a military training program run predominantly by the group. Cases when a rebel group sends its fighters to be trained by another country or rebel group do not count. However, the rebel military training may take place in another country, as long as the majority of the training is conducted by members of the rebel group.

1994: “He left me at the base to establish basic order and record keeping, and to train the new volunteers.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 8)

1994: “During the battle of Grozny, when new fighters arrived, Shamil would send them to this camp for our version of basic training; it was a three- or four-day course in how to shoot an automatic rifle, a submachine gun, and a grenade launcher.” (Akhmadov and Lanskoj 2010, 26)

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